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INTRODUCTION
When, in 1998, it came to light that a twenty-one-year-old White House
intern named Monica Lewinsky had carried on an affair with U.S. President
Bill Clinton while he was in office,' the ensuing firestorm of media coverage of
the story was predictable. So too were the President's initial denials of an
affair, and, eventually, the impeachment proceedings brought against him.
What was perhaps less predictable was the variety of ways in which Ms.
Lewinsky was characterized in the media.
A self-professed feminist writing for The Washington Monthly, which calls
itself a "progressive magazine," wrote about a "painfully sentimental,
pathologically vulnerable, sexually available young woman," noting that if she
(the writer) were not "a feminist, I guess I'd call her a pathetic little slut."2 In
the media, Ms. Lewinsky was reduced to either a cartoonishly two-
dimensional, predatory seeker of validation and attention, or a completely
mindless victim. 3 Under either characterization, she was viewed as incapable of
existing among thinking adults in a world of constrained, albeit present,
agency.
1. See, e.g., John M. Broder, The President Under Fire: Ex-Intern Offered To Tell of Clinton Affair
in Exchange for Immunity, Lawyers Report, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at A 1.
2. Elizabeth Austin, Lipstick Feminists, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1998, at 8.
3. See Douglas Turner, Senate, Public View Tapes of Testimony, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 7, 1999, at
IA (describing news accounts of Ms. Lewinsky as "a troubled person from a broken home and as a
stalker").
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Other commentators lamented the way in which the President had "us[ed]
his powerful position to seduce an impressionable young intern... .,4 By
contrast, characterizations of Clinton evinced reverence and respect even as
they expressed disapproval; one individual called him one of a group of "smart
and powerful men who know exactly what they are doing when they do it."
5
Legal observers, too, noted that when the scandal first broke, Lewinsky was
depicted as a "victim, seduced by an older and vastly more powerful man, but a
victim reluctant to complain .. ,,6
Lewinsky's depiction in popular discourse speaks volumes about the media
covering the story and the culture within which that media is embedded. The
characterization of Lewinsky-a legal adult-as wholly incapable of making a
rational choice free from coercion appears to be undergirded by the cultural
notion that she was one of numerous young female adults susceptible to being
overcome, coerced, or even seduced, to the point where she bore little to no
responsibility for her actions or choices.
It has long appeared to be the popular consensus that intimate affairs in the
workplace are private matters that arise between "consenting adults" -usually
beyond the purview of employer regulation and past the reach of the law.
7
However, adult women, who comprised 84.6% of sexual harassment plaintiffs
in fiscal year 2006,8 are not, to their detriment, being treated like consenting
adults by recent jurisprudence governing the law of sexual harassment. In the
five years following the breaking of the Clinton/Lewinsky scandal, three very
important sexual harassment cases addressing this phenomenon were decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court (Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders),9 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals (Jin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,)10 and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals (Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology).1 1
4. Jennifer Hunter, Scandals, Shootings Make Parents Jittery, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at
61.
5. Kitty Stallings, Letter to the Editor, SuN HERALD (BILOXI), Dec. 13, 2002, at D2.
6. Robert Batey, Kenneth Starr-Among Others-Should Have (Re)read Measure for Measure, 26
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 261, 285 (2001).
7. See, e.g., Billie Wright Dziech, Robert W. Dziech II & Donald B. Hordes, 'Consensual' or
Submissive Relationships: The Second-Best Kept Secret, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 83, 88 n.34
(1999) (calling the consenting adults view "simplistic"); see also A New Look at Managing Law Office
Romance, LAW OFFICE MGMT. & ADMIN. REP., Apr. 1994, at 2, 3 (advising employers dealing with
office romances to "[b]e alert to such situations as they arise, but resist the impulse to prohibit or police
a love affair between consenting adults"). But see Christina J. Fletcher, Are You Simply Sleeping Your
Way to the Top or Creating an Actionable Hostile Work Environment?: A Critique of Miller v.
Department of Corrections in the Title VII Context, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1361, 1361-62 (2006)
(observing that "[w]hile consensual sexual relationships in the workplace are certainly not illegal and
not generally a target of workplace litigation, substantial risks can arise when those relationships are
between subordinates and supervisors") (citations omitted).
8. EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charges: EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2007,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2008).
9. 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
10. 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002).
11. 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Read properly, this recent spate of cases renders plaintiffs who opt to have
intimate relations with their supervisors and fail to report their harassment far
better off than those who resist the propositioning of their bosses but fail to
report the problem.
If sexual harassment law's sole objective were to strike at harassing
behavior in the workplace, the legal framework within which cases were
adjudicated (Title VII) would confer strict legal liability upon individual
actors-harassing supervisors 12-and the companies that employed them,
without carving out an affirmative defense for employers in instances in which
the employer is deemed to have had insufficient notice of the problem. 13
However, in 1998, the Supreme Court determined that liability for supervisory
harassment would be imputed directly to defendant-employers only in certain
instances-those where a harassing supervisor exacted a "tangible employment
action," somehow ratified by the entity, upon a victim. 14 In harassment
scenarios where no such action was taken, the defendant-employer may use the
so-called Faragher/Ellerth defense and plead the efficacy of its channels of
complaint and the victim's failure to avail herself of them in order to evade
liability. 5 This defense, interposed by a defendant entity after a plaintiff makes
out her prima facie case of harassment, calls for a demonstration that the
plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of an efficacious channel of
recourse furnished by the defendant.16
On the one hand, the Supreme Court in Suders held that a constructive
discharge-the legal point at which one's workplace conditions compel the
most reasonable worker to quit employment-is not a tangible employment
action sufficient to insulate a harassment claim from the two-pronged
affirmative defense available to employers in hostile work environment cases.17
On the other hand, in Jin and Holly D., the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals held that agreeing to be intimate with one's supervisor in exchange for
12. See Anthony D. Pignotti, If You Grab the Honey, You Better Have the Money: An In-Depth
Analysis of Individual Supervisor Liability for Workplace Sexual Harassment, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV.
207, 213, 216 (2007) (noting that although "the Supreme Court has never explicitly determined whether
individual liability for the supervisor exists under Title VII," the "federal courts have unanimously held
that a supervisor may not be held liable in his individual capacity under Title VII for his acts of sexual
harassment").
13. See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61
U. PITT. L. REv. 671, 721, 740 (2000) (arguing that "[t]here is every reason to compensate the victim for
whatever harm flows from the initial act of harassment," and observing that "[i]f the affirmative defense
is construed to bar liability in some or all cases, sexual harassment victims who have suffered actionable
discrimination are often deprived of compensation for harassment even where agency principles seem to
dictate employer liability").
14. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 807 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 753-54 (1998).
15. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
16. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
17. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 (2004).
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retaining one's job status does render one's harassment claim invulnerable to
the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
1 8
Having held that a constructive discharge is not a tangible employment
action, the Suders Court has done an immense disservice to harassment victims,
whether or not they engaged in sexual relationships with their harassers.
Harassment plaintiffs who have been constructively discharged have been
effectively cut off-as a matter of law-from their ability to intercede on their
own behalf and utilize channels of complaint. Considering that constructive
discharge has been settled as a non-tangible employment action, important
questions persist as to why the Second and Ninth Circuits remain willing to
negate or somehow "undo" a plaintiffs consent to engage in sex with her
supervisor in exchange for nothing more than keeping her job, and to designate
her experience a "tangible employment action" sufficient to insulate her claim
from the affirmative defense.
The so-called "submission cases" dot a legal landscape in which the
Supreme Court has characterized constructive discharge as involving "an
employee's decision to leave,"'19 and has failed to explore properly the many
reasons why this "decision" to leave is less than wholly volitional. Not only is
the "choice" to leave in a constructive discharge scenario not a choice, but the
initial choice that a plaintiff makes to remain silent initially about her
harassment may also be far from volitional. In addition, the choice to refrain
from reporting one's harassment is no less constrained than the choice to
engage in a sexual relationship with one's harassing supervisor. The
submission cases' recognition that a plaintiffs consent to sex is not volitional
speaks volumes about the way in which courts view and treat women. The
Second and Ninth Circuits' different treatment of plaintiffs who submit to their
harassing supervisors' advances is not only inconsistent with the law of consent
and the law of employment discrimination, but it also propagates a culture that
infantilizes and incentivizes women to victimize themselves further through
their submission.
The abuse of power by a harassing supervisor who propositions and
threatens a subordinate is exactly the same irrespective of how the subordinate
responds to the behavior. Nonetheless, if the harassment goes unreported, only
the victim who relented and engaged in sex with her harassing supervisor will
have unfettered access to Title VII and the recourse that it affords. This
disparity illustrates the fact that victims are being treated differently based not
upon the harm inflicted upon them, but upon their responses to that harm.
Moreover, the abuse of power exhibited by the harassing supervisor in both
situations creates the same cause of action. This is so because "harassing
18. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2003); Jin v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 310 F.3d 84, 94-98 (2d Cir. 2002).
19. Suders, 542 U.S. at 148.
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conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex," and because sexual harassment exists
whenever the perpetrator "is motivated by general hostility to the presence of
women in the workplace."
20
This Article reveals and examines how the current law governing sexual
harassment operates, perhaps unwittingly, to favor plaintiffs who acquiesce to
the propositions of their supervisors over those who resist harassment, but
similarly fail to report it. It explores the roots of such a preference in society, as
well as its consequences. Ultimately, this Article pauses to ask the following
questions: Why does current caselaw view a victim's failure to report hostile
work environment harassment as a conscious choice whose consequences will
almost always prove fatal to her legal claim, while viewing a plaintiffs
submission to her supervisor in order to retain her job as presumptively coerced
and less than volitional? Is there a subconscious desire on the part of those
crafting the law to "rescue" or alleviate from accountability women deemed too
powerless to resist the influence and allure of a male boss? How and why
should outward indices of consent be subverted when a plaintiff alleges that she
had sex with her boss to maintain the status quo at work or to procure a
promotion or a raise?
Part I of this Article lays out the legal framework for the resolution of a
sexual harassment claim, whereby the presence or absence of a tangible
employment action will divide those claims invulnerable to the
Faragher/Ellerth defense to employer liability from those vulnerable to it. This
Part sets forth the Supreme Court's determination, subsequent to the
promulgation of the Faragher/Ellerth defense, that a constructive discharge is
not a tangible employment action, as well as the two circuits' decisions that
submission to the overtures of one's harassing supervisor is a tangible
employment action sufficient to insulate one's claim from the interposition of
the Faragher/Ellerth defense.
Part II of this Article describes the effect of the aforementioned cases,
which display a clear judicial preference for plaintiffs who acquiesce
(regardless of the surrounding circumstances) over those who resist their
harassment until they are driven out of employment. It also describes the
skeptical reaction, and some of the backlash, of the legal and academic
communities to the so-called "submission cases."
Part III asks why the decision to have a sexual relationship with one's
harassing supervisor is considered too constrained and coerced to be volitional,
while the decision to refrain from reporting harassment, when motivated by the
fear of losing one's job, is not. Section A looks at why victims' choices are
coerced. Section B reviews the factors that often conspire to compel a
constructive discharge victim to feel as though reporting her harassment is not
20. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
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an option. It also examines the cursory treatment that courts often give a
defendant's invocation of the affirmative defense before deciding that a victim
is, indeed, wholly accountable for her failure to make use of an available
reporting mechanism. Section C shows that the failure to report harassment is
just as coerced when constrained by financial and professional motivations as
when one acquiesces to a supervisor's advances.
Finally, Part IV explores the root of this preference in the law by
examining the relationship between women and consent through the lens of the
law. Outside of the context of sex and sexual relations, women have historically
been held accountable for their decisions and actions executed under various
financial or professional pressures. However, I argue, the unique and distinct
treatment of sexual harassment victims in the submission context resonates
with earlier jurisprudence concerning women in the context of sex, and
allegations that they were somehow "seduced" into having relations that they
did not want to have, and, based on society's normative values, should not have
had. All of this jurisprudence, I conclude, is undergirded by the notion that
women do not fully possess their own sexuality, and that they are susceptible to
"seduction." This notion, pervasive in society, and apparently endorsed by
court decisions in the submission cases, includes the idea that women's wills
may be overborne by pressures that fall well below the threshold of the
imminent threat of physical harm. It stands, however, in sharp contrast to
courts' traditional unwillingness to "undo" consent given in response to
financial and professional pressures in contexts outside of sex.
The result of this phenomenon is a legal system apt to infantilize women
and subvert the validity of their consent. The plight of all sexual harassment
victims needs to be contemplated by the law and the frameworks that it
employs to resolve workplace harassment claims; the unique treatment of the
submission plaintiffs ultimately operates to harm the very class of individuals
that we can only presume that the law intended to "rescue."
I. BACKGROUND
This Part lays out the jurisprudential framework within which the Supreme
Court and circuit courts have resolved issues of employer liability for
supervisory harassment in the contexts of general sexual harassment cases,
constructive discharge harassment cases, and harassment cases involving
submission.
A. Faragher and Ellerth and the Tangible Employment Action Framework
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are proh4ibited
from subjecting employees to discriminatory employment env.ronments and
2008]
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practices on the basis of their membership in a protected class, such as
gender.2 From this prohibition, the Supreme Court derived a cause of action
for sexual harassment that creates a hostile or offensive work environment or
that makes job benefits contingent upon the provision of sexual favors.22 The
scope of vicarious employer liability for various supervisory harassment
scenarios, however, remained to be unpacked over time.
23
In 1998, the Supreme Court attempted, in the companion cases of
Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth24 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,25 to
contour the parameters of employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment
in the workplace. Using basic precepts of agency law in order to deter would-be
harassers and quell harassing workplace behavior, the Court attempted
simultaneously to afford victims recourse and to provide employers with fair
notice of the actions of its agents prior to the imposition of strict liability.
26
Finding the prior distinction between quid pro quo harassment and hostile work
environment harassment to be "of limited utility,"27 the Court determined that a
critical question as to employer liability for supervisory harassment was
whether a "tangible employment action" had occurred.2 8
Within the Court's framework, then, in cases in which the harassing
supervisor used his ability to confer a "tangible employment action" upon a
plaintiff, the defendant employers were held strictly liable for the actions of the
supervisors.29 These were, the Supreme Court announced, "a class of cases
where, beyond question, more than the mere existence of the employment
relation aids in commission of the harassment: when a supervisor takes a
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2007).
22. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. The Supreme Court in Meritor declined to provide explicit guidance in this area, instructing the
lower courts only that "Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this area."
Id. at 72.
24. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
25. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
26. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65.
27. Fisher v. Elec. Data Sys., 278 F. Supp. 2d 980, 987 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S.
at 751).
28. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. Much has been written since the promulgation of the tangible
employment action as the factor that insulates a claim from the affirmative defense, and many scholars
have criticized the standard. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Bauchner, From Pig in a Parlor to Boar in a
Boardroom: Why Ellerth Isn't Working and How Other Ideological Models Can Help Reconceptualize
the Law of Sexual Harassment, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 303, 317 (1999) (criticizing the
hypertechnical distinction between incurring a tangible employment action and laboring under an
unfulfilled, but constantly looming threat, and observing that Faragher and Ellerth effectively "educate
employers as to how to harass workers effectively while incurring the least amount of liability");
Grossman, supra note 13, at 675 (arguing that Faragher and Ellerth, "far from imposing additional
liability on innocent employers, have instead created a virtual safe harbor that protects employers from
liability unless their own conduct is found wanting. This protection for employers comes at a high price,
depriving some victims of actionable sexual harassment of legal redress."); Martha S. West, Preventing
Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts' Wake-Up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 461
(2002) (questioning the "viability of the affirmative defense in actually preventing hostile environment
sexual harassment").
29. Ellerth. 524 U.S. at 765.
[Vol. 20:25
Consenting Adults?
tangible employment action against the subordinate." 30 According to the Court,
a tangible employment action was "an official act of the enterprise, a company
act," and "the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the
enterprise to bear on subordinates," because of the harasser's ability to
misappropriate and deploy the "imprimatur of the enterprise." 31 It "constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits."32 Thus, where a tangible employment
action has been taken, "it would be implausible to interpret agency principles to
allow an employer to escape liability."
33
Other cases of supervisory harassment in which no tangible employment
action was taken were termed "hostile work environment" cases, in which it
was "less obvious" that the agency relationship between the supervisor and the
plaintiff enabled the harassment.34 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged
that a supervisor's "power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct
with a particular threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is
aided by the agency relation," it did not find that cases without a tangible
employment action compelled the imposition of strict liability on the employer,
irrespective of what the employer knew or reasonably could have known about
the harassment. 35 Within the hostile work environment framework, then, the
employer could offer a two-pronged affirmative defense: that "the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior," and that "the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." 36 According to the Supreme Court, this
affirmative defense resonates with basic tort principles by ensuring that victims
of sexual harassment, like victims of other civil wrongs, are obligated to
mitigate damages.
37
B. When Plaintiffs Leave: Constructive Discharge Is Not a Tangible
Employment Action
In the 1999 Second Circuit Court of Appeals case of Caridad v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R., 38 the named plaintiff argued that she had been
30. Id. at 760.
31. Id. at 762. Typically, the Supreme Court observed, a tangible employment decision "is
documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors." Id.
32. Id. at 761.
33. Id. at 763.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 764-65.
36. Id. at 765.
37. See id. at 764.
38. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
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constructively discharged, meaning that her employment conditions had been
rendered so objectively intolerable that any reasonable person in her shoes
would have felt compelled to resign, 39 and that this constructive discharge was
a tangible employment action, making the Faragher/Ellerth defense
inapplicable.4 ° The Second Circuit rejected the latter argument, holding that a
constructive discharge was not a tangible employment action because "unlike
demotion, discharge, or similar economic sanctions, an employee's
constructive discharge is not ratified or approved by the employer. ',41
In 2003, the Third Circuit split with the Second Circuit over this issue in
the case of Suders v. Easton.42 Suders, a female police communications
operator working in an all-male police barracks, alleged that she had been
sexually harassed until she felt impelled to resign.43 Suders endured instances
of "name-calling, repeated episodes of explicit sexual gesturing, obscene and
offensive sexual conversation, and the posting of vulgar images."44 Eventually,
her harassers falsely accused her of stealing a missing file.45
Although Suders tried to confront at least one of her harassers about the
behavior, and made an effort to obtain (but did not procure or fill out) the
necessary paperwork to utilize official channels of complaint, she never filed an
official complaint.46 The plaintiff alleged that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Officer of the Pennsylvania State Police was "insensitive and
unhelpful," and directed her to complete a form without telling her how to
locate the form.47 Two days after her conversation with the officer, Suders felt
impelled to resign on the spot after a final incident in which she was falsely
accused of theft.48  Suders' harassers "handcuffed, photographed, and
questioned" her, making her feel "abused, threatened and held against her
will."49 At this point, Suders gave her harassers a letter of resignation that she
had drafted and had been carrying around with her.50 After initially refusing to
39. See Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987) ("When a constructive
discharge is found, an employee's resignation is treated... as if the employer had actually discharged
the employee.").
40. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 293. The plaintiff alleged that her harasser engaged in several episodes of
harassment, including unwelcome comments and unwelcome physical contact with her. She testified
that she found work difficult due to the fact that "she 'didn't know when [Clarke] was going to do this,'
and 'every day [she felt she] could be subject to' another attack." She also alleged that she was subjected
to unfair criticism of her work based on her gender and that other male co-workers treated her in a
hostile manner; one of them "allegedly told her that 'nobody cares what happens to you' and that she
had 'walked into a lion's den."' Id. at 290.
41. Id. at 294.
42. 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
43. Id. at 435.
44. Id at 436.
45. Id. at 438.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 438-39.
49. Id. at 439.
50. Id.
[Vol. 20:25
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allow her to leave, the plaintiffs harassers took her into an interrogation room
and read her her Miranda rights before ultimately accepting her resignation and
permitting her to leave.
51
The Third Circuit held in Suders' case that, because "some of the most
pernicious forms of workplace harassment, clearly amounting to tangible
employment actions, are often not accompanied by official company acts," and
because "a constructive discharge, when proved, operates as the functional
equivalent of an actual termination... becom[ing], for all intents and purposes,
the act of the employer,"52 a constructive discharge was a tangible employment
action.
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by reversing the Third
Circuit's holding, despite the fact that Suders had been abused, framed, and
maligned, in what the Court called a 'worse [sic] case' harassment scenario,
harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point."53 Instead, the Court held that,
"when an official act does not underlie the constructive discharge, the Ellerth
and Faragher analysis ... calls for extension of the affirmative defense to the
employer," because the plaintiff/employee's unilateral act of departure does not
adequately place the defendant on notice that corrective measures are needed.54
C. When Plaintiffs Submit: Submission Is Tantamount to a Tangible
Employment Action
In Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,55 the plaintiff Min Jin
asserted that Gregory Morabito, her supervisor at MetLife, sexually harassed
her by, among other harassing behaviors, requiring her "to attend weekly
Thursday night private meetings in his locked office," during which he would
engage in egregious acts of sexual assault.56 During these meetings, which Jin
attended for months, Morabito would "threaten her with a baseball bat, kiss,
lick, bite and fondle her, attempt to undress her, physically force her to unzip
his pants and fondle him, push against her with his penis exposed, and ejaculate
on her.",57 Additionally, Morabito made crude sexual comments to Jin, called
51. Id.
52. Id. at 458.
53. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 131-48 (2004).
54. Id. at 148-49. The Court added that, "[a]bsent such an official act, the extent to which the
supervisor's misconduct has been aided by the agency relation, as we earlier recounted ... is less
certain." Id. at 148. Suders was eagerly awaited by many members of the legal and academic
community. See, e.g., Shari M. Goldsmith, Casenote, The Supreme Court's Suders Problem: Wrong
Question, Wrong Facts Determining Whether Constructive Discharge Is a Tangible Employment Action,
6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 817, 819, 844 (2004) (arguing, after certiorari had been granted by the Court,
that Suders's "resignation was 'ratified by the employer,"' and contending that the Supreme Court
should "guarantee that resignations classified as constructive discharges would genuinely be the
functional equivalents of formal discharges.").
55. 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002).
56. Jin, 310 F.3d at 88.
57. Id. at 88-89.
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her at home, touched her in an offensive manner, and repeatedly threatened to
fire her and physically harm her if she did not submit to his sexual demands. 58
Eventually, Jin refused to attend any more weekly meetings, and Morabito
continued to fondle and harass her until MetLife terminated her employment
approximately a year and a half later.
59
Jin appealed after a jury found that she had been sexually harassed, but that
the harassment did not result in a "tangible adverse action" that altered the
terms or conditions of her employment. MetLife was successfully able to use
the Ellerth affirmative defense so as to prevent Jin from prevailing on her
sexual harassment claim before the district court. 6 1 The Second Circuit,
however, held that the district court had "defined tangible employment action
too narrowly" and had incorrectly instructed the jury that a tangible
employment action needed to be "adverse," noting that this requirement
contravened "the plain language of both Faragher and Ellerth. 62
The Second Circuit agreed with Jin that the jury ought to have been
permitted to consider as a tangible employment action the explicit conditioning
of Jin's continued employment on her submission to Morabito's sexual
demands:
Requiring an employee to engage in unwanted sex acts is one of the
most pernicious and oppressive forms of sexual harassment that can
occur in the workplace. The Supreme Court has labeled such conduct
"appalling" and "especially egregious." It is hardly surprising that this
type of conduct-a classic quid pro quo for which courts have
traditionally held employers liable-fits squarely within the definition
of "tangible employment action" that the Supreme Court announced in
Faragher and Ellerth.63
Here, Jin argued that Morabito used his authority to impose on her the
added job requirement that she submit to weekly sexual abuse in order to retain
her employment.
64
The Second Circuit also anchored its determination in the precepts of
agency, noting that it had been Morabito's status as Jin's supervisor rather than
her coworker, his ability to order her to report to his office to endure sexual
abuse, and his "empowerment by MetLife as an agent who could make
economic decisions affecting employees under his control that enabled him to
force Jin to submit to his weekly sexual abuse. ' 65 Thus, because employers are
better situated to police the behavior of supervisors through screening, training,
58. Id.
59. Id. at 89.
60. Id. at 90.
61. Id. at 93.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 94.
64. Id. (citation omitted).
65. Id.
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and monitoring, and because this policing is "certainly crucial when the
conduct to be guarded against is the criminal assault of an employee in the
employer's own offices,"66 the Second Circuit found that "Morabito's alleged
use of Jin's submission as the basis for allowing her to continue working at
MetLife creates [a] tangible employment action."
67
The court stressed the fact that the critical issue in the archetypal quid pro
quo case had always been "whether the supervisor has linked tangible job
benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual advances." 68 Thus, it found,
strict liability is properly conferred on a defendant employer where a plaintiff
submitted to an unwelcome sexual advance in exchange for retaining her
employment status. The court distinguished Jin's plight from those of the
plaintiffs in cases like Ellerth and Caridad, noting that Jin's situation was
"substantially different from the type of unfulfilled threat alleged in Ellerth,
where no job benefit was granted or denied based on the plaintiff's acceptance
or rejection of her supervisor's advances."
69
Moreover, the court noted that the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance, issued
after Faragher and Ellerth, dictated that a plaintiff's claim would not be
vulnerable to the interposition of the Ellerth defense where the plaintiff
acquiesced to unwelcome sexual demands and acquired a "tangible job benefit"
as a result,70 consistent with the circuit's pre-Faragher/Ellerth rule of strict
liability "when a supervisor 'conditions any terms of employment upon the
employee's submitting to unwelcome sexual advances."' 7 The court reiterated
two key observations that it had previously made in a 1994 case: (1) "We do
not read Title VII to punish the victims of sexual harassment who surrender to
unwelcome sexual encounters. Such a rule would only encourage harassers to
increase their persistence;" and (2) "[t]he focus should be on the prohibited
conduct, not the victim's reaction."
72
Despite the defendant's contention that the victim's reaction, "whether it
be to submit to sexual abuse or to quit employment, does not convert sexually
harassing activity into tangible employment action," 73 the court noted that the
proper analysis "focuses on the supervisor's conduct, not the victim's
reaction." 74 However, the Second Circuit's finding in Jin that her supervisor
had brought "'the official power of the enterprise to bear' on Jin by explicitly
threatening to fire her if she did not submit and then allowing her to retain her
66. Id.
67. Id. at 97 (citing Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994)).
68. Jin, 310 F.3d at 96 (quoting Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778).
69. Jin, 310 F.3d at 97.
70. Id. at 94-95.
71. Id. at 95 (quoting Karibian, 14 F.3d 773).
72. Jin, 310 F.3d at 96 (quoting Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778).
73. Jin, 310 F.3d at 97.
74. Id.
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job based on her submission," 75 inexplicably differed from its holding in
Caridad that no tangible employment action existed in the constructive
discharge even though Caridad's supervisor acted just as Jin's did.
Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology76 followed the same fact
pattern: The plaintiff alleged that her continued employment was conditioned
on her having sexual relations with Stephen Wiggins, the professor for whom
she worked.77 Holly D. alleged that she labored under the implied but
unarticulated threat that her position depended upon her compliance with his
unwelcome advances, which lasted for over a year.78 The Ninth Circuit
announced in its decision that it would "join the Second Circuit in holding that
a plaintiff who contends that she was coerced into performing unwanted sexual
acts with her supervisor, by threats that she would be discharged if she failed to
comply with his demands, has alleged a tangible employment action.... ,79
Sympathetic to the plight of a plaintiff who, "anxious to retain her position with
the employer-a job that is likely to represent her sole means of earning a
living-submits to her supervisor's sexual demands" 80 under threats, the court
found that "the threat does not simply remain unfulfilled or inchoate, but rather
results in a concrete consequence.
'
"
81
The Ninth Circuit observed that "[s]uccessful coercion ... depends on the
same abuse of supervisorial authority-the power, for example, to hire and
fire-that, Faragher/Ellerth held, renders a discharge a 'tangible employment
action.'"82 The court further found that the linchpin of the tangible employment
action determination was the implication of the "supervisor's ability to impose
upon the employee the ultimate employment penalty--discharge--or to confer
on her the ultimate employment benefit-the retention of her job. 83 The court,
however, never explained why this focus on the behavior and capabilities of the
harasser did not also place constructive discharge sexual harassment cases
within the same purview as submission cases. 84
Seeking to square its holding with the mandates of Ellerth and Faragher,
the Ninth Circuit looked to the nonexhaustive listing of tangible employment
actions enumerated by the Supreme Court and reasoned that submission to a
coercive and unwelcome advance ought to constitute a tangible employment
action.
85
75. Id. at 98.
76. 339 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2003).
77. Id. at 1161-62.
78. Id. at 1162.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1168.
81. Id. at 1168-69.
82. Id. at 1168.
83. Id. at 1169.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1173.
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We... find no reasoned distinction between the listed occurrences and
their opposites. For example, if a supervisor commits a "tangible
employment action" by "hiring" a job applicant only because she has
agreed to comply with his sexual demands then, surely, such an action
must also occur if the supervisor refuses to hire the applicant because
she is unwilling to participate in the sexual acts on which he
insists.... Most significant for this appeal, if a supervisor commits a
"tangible employment action" by "firing" an employee because she
refuses to enter into a sexual relationship, a "tangible employment
action" must also occur when he determines not to fire her because she
has performed the sexual acts he demanded.86
To date, no courts of appeals other than the Second and Ninth Circuits have
published post-Faragher and Ellerth opinions addressing the issue of whether
the receipt of benefits conditioned on submission to supervisory sexual
advances is tantamount to a tangible employment action." However, the
Supreme Court has decided that a constructive discharge-a rendering of one's
workplace conditions so objectively intolerable that one feels compelled to
resign-is not a tangible employment action that makes a claim invulnerable to
the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. So why have the Second Circuit and
Ninth Circuit recognized voluntary submission to a harassing supervisor's
advances as just such an action? The decisions in Jin and Holly D. swoop in
where a self-proclaimed victim has ostensibly consented to have sex with her
supervisor and rescue her from the consequences of acquiescing though failing
to report it.
II. THE EFFECT OF THE PREFERENCE FOR PLAINTIFFS WHO ACQUIESCE
VERSUS PLAINTIFFS WHO PASSIVELY RESIST
This Part explores the effect of the jurisprudential framework laid out in
the previous section. Specifically, it details how women who experience the
most egregious form of sexual harassment in the workplace-rape-are often
left without any recourse against their employers. Because plaintiffs who
acquiesce have access to a holding of strict liability against their employers,
86. Id. at 1170.
87. See Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 F. App'x 397 (7th Cir. 2001). In this unpublished opinion,
the court held that, while the plaintiff alleged that that she suffered sex discrimination when her male
supervisor induced her to engage in sexual relations over a four-year period, "[h]er contention that
sexual relations are 'tangible employment actions' is at variance with the definition given in Faragher
and Ellerth, which used that phrase to refer to ... acts that may be viewed as the official acts of the
employer.., a supervisor's sexual activity is not attributed to the firm unless it fails to take preventive
or responsive steps within its power." Id. at 399. In Lutkewitte v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 248 (D.C. Cir.
2006), the court addressed the plaintiff's "contention that her ability to receive job-related benefits was
conditioned on her submission to [her supervisor's] demands." Id. at 252. Because it could not find an
adequate nexus between the plaintiffs receipt of benefits and her sexual submission to her supervisor,
the court declined to "address larger questions regarding the extent to which Faragher and Ellerth are
applicable in the 'submission' context." Id. at 254.
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they are able to recover for the harm they have sustained, whereas victims who
passively resist often do not. This Part will look at and add to the criticism this
disparity has garnered.
A. The Harsh Reality: An Illustrative Case
Upon the issuance of Faragher and Ellerth, a crucial distinction was forged
between sexual harassment cases in which a tangible employment action was
taken and those in which one was not; only in the latter scenario would a case
be rendered vulnerable to Ellerth defense. This defense precludes employer
liability in cases where employer can demonstrate that the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to avoid harm by taking advantage of sexual harassment
complaint procedures. 88 Where a victim reports her harassment in a timely and
effective fashion, the affirmative defense should not be successful, and the
victim should be unfettered by it as she sets out to vindicate her rights.
However, where a plaintiff who did not suffer a tangible employment
action fails to report her harassment, this failure will be fatal to her claim unless
the court finds that the defendant's antiharassment policy was missing or
defective or that the plaintiff's behavior was reasonable. This rule has proven to
be rigid, irrespective of the severity of the incidents precipitating a victim's
constructive discharge. In Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc.,89 a
pharmaceutical sales representative sued her employer, alleging that, after she
told her direct supervisor that she wanted a promotion, he made a series of bold
and inappropriate advances toward her, escalating until he raped her repeatedly
one evening.90 As the Eleventh Circuit recounted:
Walton did not immediately report the alleged assault to either her
employer or the police. The next day, Walton called in sick. She
returned to work later that week, and about a week later.., she
attended a lunch business meeting with Mykytiuk [the supervisor].
After the meeting, he asked her to give him a ride back to his
apartment.... [where] Mykytiuk allegedly raped her yet again. After
the alleged assault, Mykytiuk apologized to Walton, who was crying.
He said that it would not happen again and that they would have a
professional relationship in the future. Once again, Walton did not
immediately report Mykytiuk's conduct to either her employer or the
police.
91
When harassment of Walton continued, a friend in whom she had confided
brought her plight to the attention of someone who worked for a sister
company, and Walton was subsequently advised to report her situation through
88. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
89. 347 F.3d 1272 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
90. Id. at 1275-76.
91. Id. at 1276.
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her company's official channels. 92 It was not, however, until more than two
months after her initial assault that Walton finally reported Mykytiuk to her
company's human resources department. Mykytiuk was subsequently
terminated for "exercising poor judgment," but the plaintiff was informed that
her employer "could not conclude that she had been raped and that they were
unable to exclude the possibility of a consensual affair."93 Walton, who had
gone on leave shortly after she reported her harassment, went on long-term
disability, but was terminated when she failed to return to work after a
reviewing physician determined that she was no longer disabled.
After Walton brought a sexual harassment suit, the district court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the Ellerth
defense. It held that the defendant had behaved reasonably to prevent and then
promptly correct the harassing behavior and that the plaintiff had unreasonably
failed to properly utilize the defendant's anti-harassment policy.94 On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that her termination following a request for long-term
disability benefits amounted to a tangible employment action, which should
have precluded the affirmative defense.
95
The court of appeals, however, held that while there was "no question but
that Walton's discharge constitutes a tangible employment action" 96 and that
she was arguably harassed because of her sex, there was no evidence that she
was terminated on the basis of her sex. 9 7 The court refused to discern a nexus
between the plaintiffs harassment and the disability that she claimed persisted
despite her mandate to return to work. It did this by focusing solely on her
termination, which stemmed from her failure to return to work, and the fact that
her harasser technically played no role in her termination.
98
The court refused to address the plaintiffs argument that her rapes were
tantamount to tangible employment actions, noting that this argument had been
raised for the first time on appeal. 99 The court went on to evaluate her claim of
hostile work environment sexual harassment, holding that while the harassment
she experienced clearly rose to the point of being actionable,100 the applicability
of the affirmative defense operated to foreclose her claim. 10 1 Walton was left
without remedy against the defendant.
92. Id. at 1277.
93. Id. at 1278.
94. Id. at 1279.
95. Id. at 1281.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Indeed, the court said that, "[t]o the extent that Walton claims that Mykytiuk's conduct
precluded her from returning to work, that claim is properly considered as a constructive discharge
claim .... Id. at 1282 n.7.
99. Id. at 1283 n.10.
100. Id. at 1285 n.12 (noting "few incidents, isolated or not, that are more serious than those
alleged to have occurred in this case").
101. Id. at 1293.
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The court left open the issue of whether the alleged rapes were tangible
employment actions by choosing not to entertain the question. However, even
in that pre-Suders era, before the Supreme Court held that an act amounting to
a constructive discharge was not, as a matter of law, a tangible employment
action, courts were inclined to view even the most horrific criminal assaults on
victims at work as falling short of being tangible employment actions. In 2003,
for example, a district court in Virginia adjudicating a harassment suit in which
the plaintiff alleged "rape at knifepoint" found that "[e]ven if [the alleged
harasser] were a supervisor, there was no tangible employment action taken...
that would short-circuit [the defendant's] ability to claim the Faragher/Ellerth
defense,"'10 2 because "[t]here was nothing done to [the plaintiff] that changed
her employment condition through the use of supervisory power."10 3 The court
observed that "nothing. . . 'made [the plaintiff] defenseless against the
[harassment] in ways that comparable conduct by a mere co-worker would not'
have done."
' 104
Following the Supreme Court's 2004 pronouncement in Suders that the
touchstone of deciding when an act is a tangible employment action is whether
or not an "official company act" took place, 0 5 even an actual rape would likely
not qualify as a tangible employment action. 10 6 This is because, even according
to the submission cases in which intercourse between a victim and a harasser is
deemed a tangible employment action, "unconditional liability attaches only if
a quid pro quo threat is implemented," and the "supervisor actually coerces sex
by abusing the employer's authority, and thus makes concrete the condition of
employment he has imposed."
10 7
102. Cooper v. City of Roanoke, No. 7:02-CV-00673, 2003 WL 24117704, at *4 (W.D. Va. Jan.
10, 2003).
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 333 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also Conatzer
v. Medical Prof'I Bldg. Servs., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1267 (N.D. Okla. 2003) ("In an effort to
circumvent the EllerthlFaragher affirmative defense, plaintiff argues that Woodruff's assaults were, in
themselves, tangible employment actions. This argument obviously lacks merit. If sexually harassing
behavior by a supervisor could, in itself, be construed as a tangible employment action, the affirmative
defense ... would be a dead letter.").
105. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
106. See, e.g., Allen v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., No. 2:05-CV-00707, 2007 WL
2815569, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2007) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that her physical assault was a
tangible employment action, because it "did not change her employment status or reduce her job
benefits").
107. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003). But see Bolick v. Alea
Group Holdings, Ltd., No. Civ. 3:03CV165, 2005 WL 2621516, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2005)
(apparently mischaracterizing the holding in Jin by stating that in that case "the Court held only that the
criminal assault of an employee constituted a tangible employment action"). In fact, Jin addressed its
legal holding to a supervisor's "classic quid pro quo" achieved by "[r]equiring an employee to engage in
unwanted sex acts," and specifically, in that case, by the supervisor's "order[ing] her to submit to
demeaning sexual acts, explicitly threaten[ing] to fire her if she did not submit, and then allow[ing] her
to keep her job after she submitted." See Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 310 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir.
2002).
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Indeed, only a few years after it decided Jin, the Second Circuit addressed
a case in which the plaintiff claimed to have been continually harassed and
propositioned by her supervisor, but admitted "she did not always resist [his]
advances and never reported the various incidents now complained of."108 The
district court had characterized the relationship as one in which there "was
clearly a mutual emotional bond."' 1 9 The Second Circuit said that unlike in Jin,
where the plaintiff "received an official employment benefit-the retention of
her job-in return for submitting to her supervisor's physical abuse," the
plaintiff here never argued that her harasser "explicitly threatened her with
termination or otherwise formally altered or threatened to alter her job
responsibilities if she did not submit to his advances."' 10 It appears that absent a
bargained exchange, even a court that is willing to view submission as a
tangible employment action is not equally poised to view intercourse outside of
that context as a tangible employment action as well.
What, then, is the significance of the Walton case? Although it was decided
before the Supreme Court decided Suders, the result would have been the same
post-Suders. Because no "official action" emanated from the company, despite
the fact that "few incidents, isolated or not, [] are more serious than those
alleged to have occurred in this case,"'II the court held that no tangible
employment action had occurred. A juxtaposition of Walton's rape scenario
with the "submission cases" brings into sharper focus the courts' inconsistency
in dealing with the cases of constructive discharge. Those victims who give
consent-albeit coerced-to have sex with their supervisors often fare better
under the law than those who are raped or assaulted, or those who are
constructively discharged.
B. Examining the Submission Cases
In the Second Circuit, an employee faced with a quid pro quo
proposition fares better by submitting to a sexual demand rather than
refusing and immediately reporting it. 112
Even before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Suders, several district
courts had already taken issue with Jin's holding that submission can create a
tangible employment action where there would otherwise not be one." 3 These
district courts noted that Jin represented "a return to the pre-Faragher/Ellerth
108. Finnerty v. William H. Sadlier, Inc., No. 7:04CV07007, 2005 WL 5353241, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jul. 25, 2005), rev'd, 176 F. App'x 158 (2d Cir. 2006).
109. Finnerty, 2005 WL 5353241, at *2.
110. Finnerty, 176 F. App'x at 162.
111. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1285 n.12 (11 th Cir. 2003).
112. Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
113. See, e.g., id. at 1225 (finding the Second Circuit's reasoning in Jin to be both inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent and detrimental to the employee duty to avoid harm).
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state of sexual harassment law where the category of harassment determined
vicarious liability."' 114 Indeed, some courts have contended that the retention of
one's job, even if predicated on one's sexual submission, cannot be the basis
for vicarious liability because it does not constitute the "significant change in
status" required by Faragher and Ellerth.1 15 Moreover, some courts have
argued that predicating quid pro quo status on a plaintiffs submission divests
employees of their "coordinate duty to avoid harm" and subverts the avoidable
consequences doctrine by providing a disincentive to report or otherwise end
harassment.116
A rebuffed supervisory advance, harassment that precipitates a victim's
quitting, and a workplace affair all occur beyond the sight of an employer-
although often right under its nose. In none of these scenarios is the employer
afforded the opportunity to correct unreported behavior. The Second Circuit,
however, maintains that Jin is "consistent with" Caridad because, while the
retention of an employment benefit in exchange for submission is "a classic
quid pro quo," a constructive discharge is not officially mandated or ratified by
an employer." 17 Some other courts have followed the Second Circuit's
approach, and have found that allowing one to retain one's status quo or
conferring benefits in exchange for submission is a tangible employment
action. One district court has observed:
It would be a perverse result if the employer is foreclosed from raising
the affirmative defense if its supervisor denies a tangible job benefit
based on an employee's rejection of unwelcome sexual demands, but
can raise the defense if its supervisor grants a tangible job benefit
based on submission to such demands." 8
Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in
Enforcement Guidelines issued in 1999, has noted that according to the
Supreme Court, "there must be a significant change in employment status; [but]
it did not require that the change be adverse in order to qualify as tangible."' 
119
114. id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Finnerty v. William H. Sadlier, Inc., 176 F. App'x 158, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2006).
118. Temores v. Cowen, 289 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (N.D. I11. 2003) (quoting EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY
SUPERVISORS (1999)). The EEOC Enforcement Guidance states that:
If a supervisor undertakes or recommends a tangible job action based on a subordinate's
response to unwelcome sexual demands, the employer is liable and cannot raise the
affirmative defense. The result is the same whether the employee rejects the demands and is
subjected to an adverse tangible employment action or submits to the demands and
consequently obtains a tangible job benefit .... In both those situations the supervisor
undertakes a tangible employment action on a discriminatory basis.
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY
SUPERVISORS (1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docstharassment.html (emphasis added)
[hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
119. Temores, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (quoting EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note
118).
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But why would the Supreme Court intend to allow submission to be tantamount
to the conferral of a tangible employment action? Courts propounding Jin's
reasoning have noted that "[olne of the hallmarks of a tangible employment
action-and the reason why the Supreme Court concluded an employer should
be held strictly liable for the action-is that the agency relationship gave the
supervisor the power to take the action he has taken against the plaintiff."'
2 0
Moreover, some courts applying Jin have been willing to isolate aspects of
the consensual relationship between a plaintiff and her supervisor-such as
time she felt compelled to spend with him rather than pursuing her career-and
brand these collateral effects of the relationship as tangible employment actions
conferred upon and sustained by the plaintiff.121 In any event, there are ample
reasons why the different treatment of plaintiffs in sexual
harassment/submission cases and plaintiffs in sexual harassment/constructive
discharge cases is ideologically untenable under either public policy or law.
C. Taking Aim at the Submission Cases
Scholars and courts alike have criticized the submission cases for failing to
comport with either the Supreme Court's or Congress's conception of Title VII.
Professor Heather Murr has attempted to explain why the submission as a
tangible employment action argument was crafted and then sanctioned by
courts of appeal, concluding that:
Given the documented pro-employer trend in granting summary
judgment on the... affirmative defense, and the courts' rather cursory
and often incorrect analysis of the two prongs, it is highly unlikely that
an employer will fail in its efforts to successfully assert the affirmative
defense. In light of this trend, it is understandable why harassment
victims are pleading, and certain courts are construing, supervisory
sexual extortion cases as tangible employment actions in an effort to
hold employers strictly liable for such conduct.
122
This explanation, however, simply does not work. First, the reasoning in
the submission cases appears to contravene a crucial mandate of Faragher and
120. Id. at 1002 (citing Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1998)).
121. See, e.g., Bennett v. Progressive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190, 205 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Plaintiff
was allegedly on a career track to become an outside road adjuster. Such a position involves significant
time out of the office, and is essentially a promotion. Mitchell denied her the opportunity to pursue such
an avenue, or at least slowed down the process, by ensuring that plaintiff spent an increasing amount of
time in the office with him. This could be found by a jury to significantly hamper, or even eliminate, a
tangible job benefit.").
122. Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure To Hold Employers Strictly Liable for
Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 529, 539 (2006) (footnote omitted). The author goes on to propose a framework for courts'
analyses of the second prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense in what she terms "sexual extortion
cases": "Under the proposed framework, employers will be liable for supervisory sexual extortion
specifically, and supervisory sexual harassment more generally, under circumstances where it was not
unreasonable for the employee to submit to the supervisor's abusive conduct." Id.
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Ellerth: The touchstone of any tangible employment action analysis is that the
action needs to be "an official act of the enterprise ... a company act" and "the
means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to
bear on subordinates" through the harasser's ability to misappropriate and
deploy "the imprimatur of the enterprise."'
123
Specifically, both submission and constructive discharge plaintiffs must
argue that having to withstand harassing behavior at some point became "an
additional job requirement or, alternatively, resulted in a constructive reduction
51,124in pay. Professor Murr, however, points out that because all hostile work
environment plaintiffs can put forth this argument to some extent, deeming
only submission cases to confer a new job requirement upon a victim that
constitutes a tangible employment action "would eviscerate the distinction"
125
drawn in Faragher and Ellerth between cases that do and do not contain a
tangible employment action.
Moreover, it seems that the Court's goal in Faragher and Ellerth was to
confer tangible employment action status on concrete, material, and affirmative
acts requiring an official corporate mandate and reflected in official company
documentation. However, it is difficult to characterize the retention of the
status quo (the benefit enjoyed by submission plaintiffs) as such an act because
it is not officially exacted or recorded by the defendant-employer. 126 Other
scholars have similarly pointed out that a submission scenario conflicts with
Temores's requirement of a "significant change in status," because maintenance
of the status quo cannot constitute a change in status of any magnitude. 127 On
the other hand, the victim's "voluntary submission to a supervisor's sexual
advances does not constitute a tangible employment action because a tangible
employment action requires 'an official act of the enterprise, a company
act.""
,!28
A constructively discharged, harassed employee makes the unilateral,
albeit coerced, decision to leave. A "submission" plaintiff makes a unilateral
choice to submit to her supervisor's advances. In both instances, the choice
resides wholly with the employee, who short-circuits the employer-defendant
123. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762. Typically, the Court observed, a tangible employment decision "is
documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors." Id.
124. Murr, supra note 122, at 575.
125. Id.; see also Carrie E. Fischesser, Employer Vicarious Liability for Volunteer Relationships
Between Supervisors and Employees, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 637, 651 (2006) (noting the ideological
inconsistencies between the submission cases and "the Supreme Court's prior definition of tangible
employment action").
126. See, e.g., Murr, supra note 122, at 577 ("Because an avoided-job-detriment plaintiff maintains
the status quo, she cannot demonstrate the requisite change in employment status, much less the
requisite significant change.").
127. See, e.g., Fischesser, supra note 125, at 652 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761) ("The Supreme
Court has clearly stated that if the supervisor takes no specific job action, then the employer will not be
strictly liable for the supervisor's conduct. In both Jin and Holly D., the supervisor took no specific job
action.").
128. Fischesser, supra note 125, at 652.
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entirely and fails to engage in the harn avoidance contemplated by the
Supreme Court in the creation of the affirmative defense. 129 It thus makes little
sense for a court to acknowledge the defendant's inability to cure the harm and
to foreclose relief for the plaintiff in the constructive discharge scenario, but to
acknowledge that the plaintiff's "choice" was coerced and thus excused without
consideration of the tort harm avoidance principles in the submission scenario.
Just as a plaintiff can provide her employer with notice of her harassment so as
to avoid further harm before she leaves her employment, so may a plaintiff
stave off her injury by complaining about or otherwise reporting an
inappropriate advance before choosing to submit to it. Nonetheless, under the
current state of the law, "[a] subordinate who submits to a supervisor's
unwelcome sexual advances to avoid the threatened termination arguably
possesses a graver claim than a subordinate who successfully resists her
supervisor's advances and threats but is not terminated."
' 130
The initial line drawn by the Supreme Court when it first set forth its
framework for vicarious liability for supervisor harassment in Faragher and
Ellerth made an indelible distinction between victims who feel able to report
their harassment and those who feel compelled to remain silent. As will be
explained in the next section of this Article, although the corporate ethos of
many workplaces coerces victims not to report harassment, this failure to report
is viewed by the courts as a volitional choice-and a crucial, often fatal choice
at that.
Il. ASKING THE UNASKED QUESTION: WHY UNDO CONSENT FOR
HARASSMENT PLAINTIFFS IN SUBMISSION CASES BUT HOLD OTHER VICTIMS
FULLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR FAILURE To REPORT HARASSMENT?
Here is what the law says is bad: Trading sex for money is bad;
trading a promise not to cause serious harm for sex is bad...
Forcing unwanted affections or love on adults is sometimes bad, but
only ifpurposefully or at least clearly threatening. What to make of all
129. Murr, supra note 122, at 586, 593; see also id. at 596 ("Under both of the above scenarios, the
imposition of strict liability turns not on the supervisor's conduct but instead on whether the employee
either successfully resisted the threat of an unwarranted job detriment or refused the promise of an
unwarranted job benefit."); see also Fischesser, supra note 125, at 656 (arguing that "[tihe approach of
the Second and Ninth Circuits discourages employees from avoiding or ending harassment and
discrimination").
130. Murr, supra note 122, at 586; see also Amanda M. Jarratt, Comment, Customizing the
Reasonable- Woman Standard To Fit Emotionally and Financially Disabled Plaintiffs Is Outside the
Scope of the Civil Rights Act's Prohibition on Sex-Based Discrimination: Holly D. v. California Institute
of Technology, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 127, 148 (2004) (arguing that "[c]onditioning employer
liability on the plaintiffs distorted perception of the supervisor's conduct does not further workplace
equality. While the idea of an emotionally or financially depressed individual submitting sexually to her
supervisor in order to 'save' her job is distressing, the fact remains that Title VII is concerned with
eliminating gender discrimination.").
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this? At issue is love, affection, sexual intimacy, sex without intimacy.
At issue is money, or what it stands for-property. 13
1
The critical question is why courts have been so willing to view submission
as coerced when plaintiffs engage in intimate relations with their supervisors,
while the Supreme Court has not been willing to do the same for victims who
make a similarly coerced choice to quit employment because they are
constructively discharged. In an ideal world, victims' constrained agency
would be recognized, and all constructive discharges-whether they involved
rape, assault, or any kind of pressure sufficient to compel a reasonable person
to leave employment-would be deemed tangible employment actions
warranting the imposition of strict liability against the employer. In the world
in which we live, however, cases involving submission are treated differently
from other cases, and we should ask why.
A. Asking the Question
The current state of the law in parts of this country favors those
victims/plaintiffs who submit to their supervisors' harassing demands over
those who passively resist them until they are forced out of employment. In
these submission cases, the courts seem perfectly willing to step in and undo
what may have been adult, legal consent to engage in a sexual relationship.
Although this consent is later argued by harassment plaintiffs to have been
given under certain constraints, these pressures need not be anything more than
professional or economic ones-extreme fear of losing one's professional
status, employment, or income stream-in order for certain courts to declare
the plaintiff was harmed by a tangible employment action.
Those who are constructively discharged-meaning those working in
conditions so objectively intolerable that a reasonable person in their shoes
would feel compelled to resign-typically also feel that their professional status
and income are threatened by their harassers. These victims' departures are
viewed by the courts as unilateral choices-and as choices that come with the
consequence of having their claims made vulnerable to the Faragher/Ellerth
defense. This differential treatment begs the question: Why would courts undo
a seemingly volitional decision made by a plaintiff (to have sex with a
harassing supervisor), but not view as equally coerced the choice of a victim
who passively resists harassment and does not report it immediately or at all?
It may be argued that on one level, perhaps these courts' views on the
matter are colored by a sense that in the face of nonreporting, one outcome-
coerced workplace sexual relations-is intolerable under any set of
131. Nancy L. Cook, In Celia's Defense: Transforming the Story of Property Acquisition in Sexual
Harassment Cases Into a Feminist Castle Doctrine, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 197, 302-03 (1999).
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circumstances, while the other outcome- the victim's coerced flight from the
workplace-is somehow more tolerable. 13 Such a puritanical view does little
to advance the plight of victims at work, but it does fuel what Nadine Strossen
has called "demeaning stereotypes about women, including that sex is bad for
us.' 33 The argument, then, would be that certain courts have on some level
come to the rather patriarchal conclusion that because unmarried sex
engendered by workplace and power disparities is "bad," unfettered recourse
must be afforded to the submission plaintiffs. The alternative scenario, in which
a victim is harassed until she is compelled to leave, would appear to certain
courts far more palatable.
Clearly, the courts in the submission cases viewed the circumstances
surrounding the sexual relationship-the power dynamic, the corporate culture,
the financial pressures to acquiesce-as reasons to undo the plaintiffs consent
and to disregard the volitional nature of the plaintiff's choice, thereby
mitigating the consequences of the decision. 134 Despite this recognition by
some courts, the current state of the law permits little to no acknowledgement
of the realities that often permeate a workplace in which harassment occurs.
These realities both discourage a victim from reporting a hostile environment
and unfulfilled threats and force her to quit her employment. Specifically,
courts' applications of the first Faragher/Ellerth prong turn a blind eye toward
132. Cf Linda Clarke, Harassment, Sexual Harassment, and the Employment Equality (Sex
Discrimination) Regulations 2005, 35 INDUS. L.J. 161, 175-76 (2006) (proposing that the government
introduce a statutory tort of harassment in light of the fact that "'[u]nderlying many workplace sex codes
is a puritanical attitude that views sex as bad and casts women as needing protection from male sexuality
and their own sick desires. The ideology that women's sexuality is nonexistent or shameful accounts for
why sexualisation can become a means to discredit and silence them. It also deprives women of their
own legitimate sexual expression."') (quoting Jean L. Cohen, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL
PARADIGM 137 (2002)); Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Love at Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 237,
251-52 (2006) ("[T]he fight against sexual harassment was possible not only because companies wanted
to avoid vicarious liability in sexual harassment claims, but because the fight was supportive of pre-
existing managerial notions that sex is bad for productivity.").
133. Nadine Strossen, "Is Minnesota Progressive?" A Focus on Sexually Oriented Expression, 33
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 51, 60 (2006) (discussing why suppression of pornography undermines
women's equality). Professor Aya Gruber has discussed the societal message sent to women that "sex is
bad" in the context of the law surrounding rape, observing that "[m]aking women assume the risk of
rape aims at discouraging them from remaining silent, dressing sexy, or going to bars, by
decriminalizing the resultant sexual abuse." Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem
of Tort-Type Defenses in the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 251 (1997).
Thus, she has concluded, "criminal law should not permit the informal imposition of liability on victims,
not just because women should have the freedom to do as they please, but also because the underlying
acts themselves are not the kind that should be condemned by society." Id.
134. It should be emphasized that this Article addresses itself to courts' treatment of women who
engage in an intimate relationship with a supervisor in order to retain their employment status,
irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. Inasmuch as this Article argues that any scenario,
involving relations or not, that amounts to a constructive discharge ought to be a tangible employment
action, it does not deny that the point at which this occurs for a reasonable female plaintiff may not be
the same point at which it would occur for a male. In any event, to bypass the analysis of the
reasonableness of a plaintiff's reaction to a given threat and to presume that any time that sex occurred,
a tangible employment action occurred, is improper, especially where the plaintiff's harm avoidance has
been factored into the calculus of employer liability by the Supreme Court.
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defects in technically adequate policies that render them wholly ineffective at
times. More importantly, courts have consistently shown indifference to the
myriad of ways in which a defendant's corporate culture; the relative physical
or circumstantial situation of individuals in a hostile workplace; and the stark
realities of being a harassment victim and feeling isolated, mistrusted, and
fearful-as fearful, perhaps, as a woman who engages in a sexual relationship
with her supervisor out of fear for her job-can conspire to render reasonable a
victim's failure to report her harassment. This all underscores the point that the
law, as set forth by the Second and Ninth Circuits, has been selective as to
when it will undo consent so that a plaintiffs claim may survive and when it
will demand accountability for an action or a failure to act. The result of this is
a legal system that favors women who exist in one paradigm-the women
perceived as helpless victims of their harassers, seduced by power, fear, and
desperation, despite the fact that they made a choice to engage in sex with their
supervisors-over women who exist in another paradigm-those who passively
resist their harassers despite their fear of or inability to go about reporting it,
until they are eventually driven out of the workplace entirely.
It is important to note that this Article restricts its discussion of the
relationship between women, sex, consent, and submission to examples that do
not occur in the context of violent crime. It is only where lawful consent was
given-ostensibly, as judged through the lens of criminal law-that a
submission scenario may be argued to parallel a constructive discharge
scenario. It is equally important to note that the behavior of the harasser
described in Jin certainly appears to have been criminal in several respects.1 35
However, by reasoning that the harasser's "use of Jin's submission as the basis
for allowing her to continue working at MetLife create[d] the tangible
employment action," 136 and that the harasser's "use of his supervisory authority
to require Jin's submission was, for Title VII purposes, the act of the
employer," 137 as well as by holding that the jury ought to have been instructed
to consider the exchange of continued employment for submission as a
plausible tangible employment action, 138 Jin is consonant with cases like Holly
D. in which no criminal act took place.' 39 This Article leaves for another day a
135. Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2002).
136. Id. at 97.
137. Id. at 98.
138. Id.
139. In Holly D., the court noted that the plaintiff did not allege that her supervisor
used physical force to coerce sex, or that he explicitly threatened her with job-related
consequences if she did not have sex with him. Nor d[id] she assert that he ever stated,
directly or indirectly, that there was a connection between his requests for sex, initial or
otherwise, and any problem with her past work performance or her prospects for future
employment.
Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless, the court noted, she
premised her claim "on what she believe[d] to be indications that her job depended on her sexual
submission." Id.
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discussion of how the law does and should treat sexual harassment plaintiffs
who were the victims of violent crime.
B. Not Always a "Choice ": Why Victims Don't Report Harassment
This Section explains why courts' treatment of the facts and arguments in
sexual harassment cases, as well as the workplace realities that often surround
harassment, can discourage victims from coming forward to report the
harassment. It is important to look at how and why so many victims find
themselves in a predicament where they failed to report their harassment in the
first place. After all, if a victim uses available channels of internal complaint to
complain about her harassment and it persists, the defendant will not be able to
deflect her claim through the successful interposition of the Faragher/Ellerth
defense.
Workplace realities make it such that many victims of harassment do not
feel that they can report harassing behavior. 140 A victim of a relentless harasser,
who chooses or feels forced to remain silent while continuing to labor in a
hostile work environment where threats remain unfulfilled, is left with only two
remaining options. She can either submit to the unwelcome demands, or tacitly
tolerate the behavior while resisting the advances until the environment
becomes so oppressive that she cannot take it any more and feels compelled to
resign. Before examining these dual scenarios and the way in which the law
treats them, it is worth examining how so many victims wind up at that fork in
the road-feeling too fearful or powerless to report harassment, and ultimately,
compelled to resign.
According to the EEOC, in comportment with the affirmative defense's
requirement that a successful defendant exercise reasonable care to remedy and
prevent workplace harassment, "[r]emedial measures should be designed to
stop the harassment, correct its effects on the employee, and ensure that the
harassment does not recur." 141 Despite this, courts have traditionally viewed
with skepticism and incredulity plaintiffs' assertions that they were too
frightened or intimidated by their supervisors or by their corporate
environments to report their harassment. This phenomenon, coupled with
corporate and workplace environments that do, in fact, discourage employees
from pursuing official internal harassment complaints,142 causes many
140. See Anne Lawton, The Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual
Harassment, I 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 86 (1999) ("[T]he most frequently occurring reaction to
sexual harassment is inaction.") (quoting U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 3 (1995)).
141. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 118.
142. See generally Joanna Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over
Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 51-52 (2003) (explaining that there
are numerous reasons why victims fail to use internal channels of complaint, including fear of
retaliation, ostracization, and alienation from mentors and coworkers, as well as "blam[ing] themselves
20081
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 20:25
otherwise successful plaintiffs to be foreclosed from prosecuting their rights.
This is because while they may have made out a prima facie case of
harassment, their employers can establish that they will not succeed in
overcoming the Faragher/Ellerth defense, and can thus procure summary
judgment on their claims.
1. Courts'Adjudication of the First Prong of the Affirmative Defense
Since Faragher and Ellerth, courts have followed a new approach in
reviewing the adequacy of policies for the purposes of applying the first prong
of the affirmative defense. Policies pass muster despite having flaws that, it was
argued, rendered them overly onerous, if not impossible, to use. For example,
less than two years after Faragher and Ellerth, the Eleventh Circuit held that a
defendant's complaint procedures were in compliance with the requirements
for the affirmative defense where they set forth only one person in the
plaintiffs' workplace to be contacted regarding sexual harassment, and that
individual was both the plaintiffs' store manager and their harasser. 143 Having
failed to find bad faith on the part of the defendant or any inherent defect in the
policy, nn the court noted that its "sister circuits have found more narrowly
for the situation, or because '[c]alling attention to offensive behavior reinforces stereotypes of women as
victims."') (quoting Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment
in Law Firms, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 46, 51); Lea B. Vaughn, The Customer Is Always Right... Not!
Employer Liability for Third Party Sexual Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2002); see also
West, supra note 28, at 523 (arguing that the affirmative defense "has the potential to create meaningful
dispute resolution procedures at work," but that if "women remain afraid and reluctant to complain,
employers will continue to escape their obligation to provide a place to work where both women and
men enjoy an equal opportunity to succeed").
143. Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11 th Cir. 2000). The court based
its reasoning on the fact that there were "other designated, appropriate company representatives...
accessible to Publix's store employees" via weekly visits and a toll-free phone number provided to
employees. Id. Due to this, and the "open door policy" providing what the court felt were "multiple
avenues for lodging a sexual harassment complaint outside the supervisory chain of command," the
court found the policy to be adequate. Id. at 1294, 1299. This is particularly ironic in light of the court's
flat rejection of the plaintiffs' argument that their reporting of harassment to mid-level managers, "rather
than the individuals delineated in Publix's sexual harassment policy, was not unreasonable given
Publix's Open Door Policy." Id. at 1297, 1302.
144. The policy at issue consisted of the "Statement Concerning Prohibited Harassment, Including
Sexual Harassment" in the employee handbook, which read:
To help ensure that none of us ever feel we are being subjected to harassment, and in order to
create a comfortable work environment, the Company prohibits any offensive physical,
written or spoken conduct regarding any of these items, including conduct of a sexual nature.
If any of us believe that he or she is being subjected to any of these forms of harassment, or
believes he or she is being discriminated against because other associates are receiving
favored treatment in exchange for, (example-sexual favors), he or she must bring this to the
attention of appropriate persons in Company Management. The very nature of harassment
makes it virtually impossible to detect unless the person being harassed registers his or her
discontent with the appropriate Company representative. Consequently, in order for the
Company to deal with the problem, we must report such offensive conduct or situations to the
Store Manager, District Manager or Divisional Personnel Managers:
[list of individuals and telephone numbers by location]
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drawn anti-harassment policies to satisfy the requirement that an employer
exercise reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment."'' 45 In a later case, a
district court in the Eleventh Circuit dismissed allegations challenging the
efficacy of an unused policy, calling them "nothing[] but unsupported
conjecture[,]' 146 and holding that "[a]s part of its burden, the employer need not
prove how many times the sexual harassment policy was effectively
utilized."'
147
By endorsing policies that are, in fact, flawed in their efficacy, the legal
system permits defendants' ineffectual or even insincere attempts to cure
harassment. This can only further serve to chill employee complaints of
harassment, placing more and more victims in a position of either giving in to
their harassers or waiting to be constructively discharged because they don't
have official channels of recourse that they feel safe using. As the next Section
will show, courts are quick to dismiss victims' unsuccessful attempts to report
harassment or the reasons for their failures to report it at all.
2. Courts'Adjudication of the Second Prong of the Affirmative Defense
Similarly, courts' analyses of the second prong of the affirmative defense
evince a reluctance to take into account circumstances that might have coerced
A record of the complaint and the findings will become a part of the complaint investigation
record and the file will be maintained separately from the associate's personal file. Any
person electing to utilize this complaint resolution procedure will be treated courteously. The
complaint will be handled as swiftly and as confidentially as practical in light of the need to
remedy the problem, and registering the complaint will in no way be used against the
associate nor will it have adverse impact on the individual's employment status.
Id. at 1294 (emphasis and omission in original).
Publix also published an "Open Door Policy" in the employee handbook; it "encouraged
employees to talk to a manager about any 'problems or misunderstandings,"' and "reminded employees
that they could 'talk to anyone in management,' but encouraged them to first discuss their problem with
their 'immediate Supervisor' and then proceed to 'the next highest level of management."' Id. at 1294-
95.
145. Id. at 1299 (citing Ritchie v. Stamler Corp., 205 F.3d 1341 (6th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
("finding a policy which only allowed sexual harassment complaints to be made in writing to the
president of the company reasonable."); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1999)
("finding that promulgation of a policy which identified only an employee's supervisors and the
company's Human Resources Department as the appropriate vehicles for registering a sexual harassment
complaint and dissemination of that policy to employees satisfied the requirement that an employer
exercise reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment."); Watkins v. Prof'l Sec. Bureau, Ltd., 201 F.3d
439 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) ("concluding a policy was reasonable
when employee was not placed in the position of having to report their supervisor's conduct to someone
in the supervisor's chain of command.")); see also Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)) (noting that where "there is no
evidence that an employer adopted or administered an antiharassment policy in bad faith or that the
policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional, [its] existence ... militates strongly in favor of a
conclusion that the employer 'exercised reasonable care to prevent' and promptly correct sexual
harassment").
146. Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228 n.27 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
147. Id. The court also noted that "[w]hile it may be more effective to frequently and separately
disseminate a sexual harassment policy, Faragher/Ellerth and their progeny do not require such
measures for an employer to exercise reasonable care." Id. at 1227-28.
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a harassment victim into failing to utilize a reporting mechanism. Specifically,
the fear that accompanies reporting harassment in an environment in which
support and success is uncertain is typically given no weight, absent explicit
evidence that a plaintiff will often not be able to produce. In Faragher, the
Supreme Court said:
[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding
obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing
an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by
the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to
satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the
defense. 148
The Second Circuit, accordingly, has said that credible fear that renders a
failure to report reasonable "must be based on more than the employee's
subjective belief."' 49 The plaintiff must produce objective evidence that proves
that the employer ignored or resisted similar complaints or took adverse actions
against employees in response to such complaints.
In Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue, for example, the plaintiff
testified that though he was aware that Saks had a complaint
procedure-in his words "most big companies do"-he declined to
avail himself of it, because: "I was afraid of repercussions. If you start
to conflict with you[r], manager, before you know it its [sic] not a very
pleasant outcome." 5
In response, the court summarily dismissed the idea that any such fears could
be well-founded, holding, "[a]s a matter of law... that such generalized fears
can never constitute reasonable grounds for an employee's failure to complain
148. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
149. Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Guillebeaux v. Jewish
Child Care Ass'n, No. 1:03CV6577, 2005 WL 1265906, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2005) (rejecting the
plaintiff's assertion that she "did not immediately report the sexual harassment to which Torok subjected
[her] because [she] was embarrassed by it, was afraid that if [she] did complain [she] would not be seen
as a team player, and was afraid that by complaining [she] might place [her] job in jeopardy," because
"[c]onclusory assertions alone cannot satisfy [her] burden"). But see Deborah Zalesne, Sexual
Harassment Law in the United States and South Africa: Facilitating the Transition from Legal
Standards to Social Norms, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 200 (2002) (describing survey showing that
"women are more likely to ignore a harassing incident or use informal means of dealing with the
harassment than to report it to the appropriate authority, despite the fact that three out of every four
respondents knew about the available channels for formal reporting. Reasons given for victims' failure
to report include '(a) positive results were not likely to come of reporting, (b) the benefits of reporting
would not outweigh the repercussions, (c) they had no control over the procedure, (d) their complaint
would be trivialized, and (e) reporting would exacerbate rather than relieve their situation."').
150. 13 F. Supp. 2d. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). But see Meng v. Ipanema Shoe Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d
392, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying summary judgment on a Faragher/Ellerth defense because material
question of fact existed as to whether sexual harassment policy was distributed to employees in a timely
fashion); Mills v. George R. Funaro & Co., No. 1:99CV04816, 2001 WL 50893, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
19, 2001) (denying summary judgment due to the fact that "a genuine issue of fact exist[ed] as to
whether [the employer's] policy had force").
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to his or her employer."1 5' The court noted that although the plaintiff sought to
justify his failure to report his alleged harassment because he feared reprisal:
[E]very employee who feels harassed by a supervisor will at some
level fear the inevitable unpleasantness which will result from
complaining to the employer. Confrontation is by its very nature
unpleasant. However, to allow an employee to circumvent the
reasonable complaint requirements of Faragher and Burlington by
making conclusory allegations of feared repercussions, would
effectively eviscerate an affirmative defense which the Supreme Court
clearly went to great effort to craft in order to stem the tide of
unwarranted lawsuits.' 52
Moreover, even when victims do eventually report harassment, courts often
balk at the amount of time that it took for them to do so and subsequently
invalidate any legal effect that the reporting might have had.153 In O'Dell v.
Trans World Entertainment Corporation,154 for example, the district court
found that where a plaintiff waited almost a year after her harassment began-
and four months after her harasser became her supervisor-to report the
harassment, the "lengthy delay alone demonstrate[d] that [she] unreasonably
failed to take advantage of... preventive and corrective opportunities.
'' 55
Moreover, the court found, without any further investigation into the subject,
the fact that the plaintiff declined to participate in the internal investigation that
resulted from her complaint compounded her failure and was "unreasonable,"
even though she declined "upon the advice of counsel."' 56 In Walton, the
Eleventh Circuit found that a reporting delay of less than three months from the
151. Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (further noting that "[alt some point, employees must be
required to accept responsibility for alerting their employers to the possibility of harassment. Without
such a requirement, it is difficult to see how Title VII's deterrent purposes are to be served, or how
employers can possibly avoid liability in Title VII cases."); see also Walton v. Johnson & Johnson
Servs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("Subjective fears of reprisal may exist in every case,
but.., those fears, standing alone, do not excuse an employee's failure to report a supervisor's
harassment.").
152. Fierro, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
153. See, e.g., Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290 (plaintiffs delay of three months to report supervisor's
repeated sexual assaults was not exercise of reasonable care by an employee); see also Camille Hebert,
Why Don't "Reasonable Women" Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 725 (2007)
("Courts have generally rejected the contentions of employees that they justifiably delayed reporting
sexual harassment because of their fears of retaliation. Even courts that have expressed a willingness to
consider the possibility of retaliation as a justification for a delay ... have rejected the suggestion that a
plaintiff's subjective fear of retaliation is sufficient; instead, those courts want to see specific evidence
that retaliation was in fact likely to occur ... "); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The
Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 262 (2004) ("Once the
employer satisfies prong one by offering evidence that it has disseminated a policy and procedure and
promptly corrected the complained-of behavior, some federal courts presume that any delay by the
plaintiff in reporting is unreasonable.").
154. 153 F. Supp. 2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2001).
155. Id. at 391.
156. Id.; see also Hebert, supra note 153, at 723 (stating that "courts seem to be judging the
reasonableness of employee actions in hindsight, based on events that occurred after the initial failure to
complain").
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time of harassment was unreasonable.' 57 In Gonzalez v. Beth Israel Medical
Center,158 the court held that the defendant employer's assertion of the sexual
harassment affirmative defense could not be defeated where the plaintiff "let
the harassment continue for two and a half years and went to complain only
when threatened with termination by Sanchez for her consistent lateness.' ' 59
The court found that the plaintiff did not act reasonably in waiting to report the
harassment despite the plaintiffs contention that
she did not complain because she hoped that [the] conduct would end
if she told him to stop and avoided situations where he could harass
her, and that she was concerned about reporting him because it might
cause both of them to lose their jobs and [the harasser] had a family
that would be adversely effected [sic].160
The court called these reasons for the delay in reporting "speculative and
unsubstantiated" and declared that they are not recognized as valid excuses for
such delay. 161 The court noted that it had previously held "that in similar cases,
a lengthy delay of as little as a year is sufficient by itself to demonstrate
unreasonable failure to take advantage of an employer's preventive and
corrective opportunities."' 162 Thus, the court determined, the defendant had
made out the affirmative defense and it merited summary judgment on the
plaintiff s hostile work environment claim.
163
In 2006, the Second Circuit addressed a district court's determination that a
plaintiff did not take adequate advantage of available preventative or corrective
opportunities provided by her employer when she failed to report alleged
harassment by her supervisor for more than three years after it commenced, and
then did so after a co-worker initially apprised the employer of her
allegations. 164 When questioned about her failure to report the harassment in a
timely manner, the plaintiff maintained that, because the head of the
157. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1291 ("Subjective fears of reprisal may exist in every case, but ... those
fears, standing alone, do not excuse an employee's failure to report a supervisor's harassment").
158. 262 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2003).
159. Id. at 356.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 357 (citing Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(requiring plaintiff to offer more than fear of "unspecified repercussions and an unpleasant outcome" in
order to survive summary judgment); Dayes v. Pace Univ., No. 1:98CV03675, 2000 WL 307382, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2000) (granting employer summary judgment on its affirmative defense where
plaintiff delayed one year before reporting supervisor's harassment); O'Dell v. Trans World Entm't
Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (requiring plaintiff "to come forward with evidence
that her failure to avail herself of [defendant's] remedial procedures was caused by a credible fear that
her complaint would not be taken seriously or that she would suffer an adverse employment action"));
see also Hebert, supra note 153, at 724.
162. Gonzalez, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 356-57 (citing O'Dell, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 391(finding employer
had met burden because employee waited almost a year to report harassment); Dayes, 2000 WL 307382,
at *6 (granting employer summary judgment on its affirmative defense where plaintiff delayed one year
before reporting supervisor's harassment)).
163. Gonzalez, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
164. Finnerty v. William H. Sadlier, Inc., 176 F. App'x 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 20:25
Consenting Adults?
defendant's Human Resources Department informed her that a complaint could
not be kept confidential, she feared reprisal from her harasser, whom she held
in high esteem. 65 According to the Second Circuit, "None of those
explanations rendered her three-year delay reasonable," and the plaintiff's
respect for her harassing supervisor and not justify her delay because although
"[s]he may have had reasons that were, for her personally, sufficient to support
a decision not to report [the harassment] earlier ... that cannot be part of our
analysis. ' 66 Nor, the court added, did the plaintiffs fear of reprisal from her
supervisor excuse her refusal to report his harassment, because "[flor such
reluctance to preclude the employer's affirmative defense, 'it must be based on
apprehension of what the [defendant] employer might do."
1 67
On this last point, it must be noted that this reasoning is inconsistent with
the rationale underlying the imposition of the defense in the first place: "In
crafting the first prong of the Faragher affirmative defense, which in part
requires employers to take reasonable measures to prevent harassment, 'the
Supreme Court sought to give effect to Title VII's deterrent purpose."' 168 The
Supreme Court sought to impute liability to defendant entities where it could
discern "the imprimatur of the company the supervisor's harassing actions
carry. ' , 169 Indeed, "vicarious liability is automatic in cases involving a tangible
employment action precisely because such actions 'are the means by which the
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates."" 170 Thus, it makes little sense to predicate one's excusal on the
second prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense, which evaluates the
reasonableness of one's failure to report, on whether the plaintiff feared reprisal
by the supervisor or by the defendant enterprise. Inasmuch as a harassing
supervisor is capable of using the vehicle of his position and authority within
the enterprise to exact reprisal on a complaining defendant, the distinction is
meaningless.
3. Workplace Realities Not Recognized
Finally, despite the rationale proffered by the Supreme Court for the
affirmative defense-avoiding "a mechanical application of indefinite and
malleable factors set forth in the Restatement," while encouraging "an enquiry
165. Id.
166. Id. at 162-63 (noting that the Court had "never required a company to maintain a policy that
guarantees confidentiality in order to invoke the affirmative defense").
167. Id. at 163 (quoting Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir.
1999)).
168. Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servcs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11 th Cir. 2003) (quoting Madray
v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11 th Cir. 2000)).
169. Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 915 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).
170. Id. at 915 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)); see also Kotcher v.
Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) ("From the perspective of the
employee, the supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity.").
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into the reasons that would support a conclusion that harassing behavior ought
to be held within the scope of a supervisor's employment,"171 -- courts often
adhere rigidly to the requirement that plaintiffs follow the exact course of
action prescribed by a defendant's policy, even if a plaintiff acted in a manner
that was reasonably calculated or likely to put the defendant on actual notice of
harassment requiring correction. Such courts refuse to acknowledge the various
complexities that often chill or hinder a precise execution of the proper
complaint procedures.
In Walton, the Eleventh Circuit held the plaintiffs reporting delay of less
than three months to be unreasonable, despite the fact that, in the same month
that the harassment took place, the plaintiffs friend had informed officials at
the defendant's parent company that her supervisor had engaged in harassing
behavior toward the plaintiff.172 The court found it significant that the informed
officials were not officially responsible for addressing such complaints.
173
Moreover, the court found that while it was relevant that the plaintiff did, in
fact, complain to her harassing supervisor, himself, about the harassment, the
fact that she failed to argue that, "based on these warnings, she had reason to
believe that the advances would stop, particularly after those warnings had
already proven to be unsuccessful," undercut her argument that she had
behaved reasonably.1 74 This is particularly ironic: The fatal blow to the
plaintiff's argument was dealt by her harasser's own incorrigibility.
The court attempted to acknowledge that workplace realities do not always
create a conducive environment for prompt reporting, noting that it was
"mindful of the fact that severe harassment such as that which is alleged...
here can be particularly traumatic." 175 However, it found that "the problem of
workplace discrimination ... cannot be [corrected] without the cooperation of
the victims" and thus the plaintiffs subjective fears of retaliation could not
justify her failure to report her harassment. 176 This, too, seems inconsistent with
the court's mandate to evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiffs failure to
timely report her harassment, and not to weigh the policy interests served by
requiring promptness as opposed to excusing delay.
Finally, the court gave short shrift to the plaintiffs allegation that she felt
physically intimidated by her harasser, summarily observing that "the second
prong of the Faragher defense would be rendered meaningless if a plaintiff-
171. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 797 (1998).
172. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1289 n.15.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1290.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1302 (1 lth Cir. 2000)); see
also Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Reporting sexually offensive conduct
by a supervisor would for many or most employees be uncomfortable, scary or both. But because this
will often or ordinarily be true,... [Title VII's] regime necessarily requires the employee in normal
circumstances to make this painful effort if the employee wants to impose vicarious liability on the
employer and collect damages under Title VII.").
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employee could escape her corresponding obligation to report sexually
harassing behavior based on an unsupported subjective fear that the employee
would suffer physical harm at the hands of her alleged harasser.'
177
It is often the unspoken code of conduct at a workplace that operates to
chill reporting. It was recently reported that a jury in Illinois awarded a police
officer who served as the sole female working in an undercover gang unit in
Chicago $150,000 in damages and $500,000 in attorneys' fees after she brought
suit alleging that pornography was left in her mailbox daily. 178 According to the
Associated Press, the police department's internal affairs unit had initially
dismissed the majority of the officer's complaints, and once she reported what
was happening to her, the officer said, she became known as a "beefer," which
is a word used by officers to describe their colleagues- who report fellow
officers. 179 In an interview conducted after her jury award, the officer said that
she had returned to work, but that she felt like a pariah.180 "Five to six years
later, people still don't talk to me, still don't trust me ... . People look at you
like you have five eyes. Nobody talks to you. It's very lonely."'
181
C. One Coerced Choice Versus Another: Why Is the "Consent" Offered in
Submission Viewed by Courts as Coerced, While the "Decision" To
Refrain from Reporting Harassment Is Not?
As discussed in the previous sections, the decision not to report hostile
work environment sexual harassment is often not a voluntary decision. Rather,
an employer's corporate culture/workplace environment, coupled with the
law's harsh treatment of plaintiffs when applying the Faragher/Ellerth defense,
can render the decision not to report just as "coerced" as the decision to engage
in sex with one's harassing supervisor. The law, however, has drawn a sharp
distinction between the decision to engage in intimate relations with one's
supervisor and the decision to refrain from pursuing official channels to report
harassment. The question persists as to why. After all, the string of "what-if's"
that run through a victim's head just before she proffers her consent to have sex
with her harassing boss are not necessarily more nefarious than the "what-if's"
a victim ponders before she decides that it is too risky to report her harassing
boss and risk reprisal. While retaliation for reporting harassment is illegal under
Title VII, firing or demoting a subordinate for refusing to submit to one's
177. Walton, 347 F.3d at 1291 n.17.
178. Associated Press, Federal Jury Awards Female Chicago Police Officer Damages for
Harassment Over Mailbox Porn, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?hubtype=Regional+News&id=l 185959204328; Hebert,
supra note 153, at 740 (discussing the pressures women feel in a male-dominated workplace).
179. Associated Press, supra note 178.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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inappropriate advances is similarly illegal, and a similarly persistent barrier to
victims' agency.
The final section of this Article will explore the complex relationships
between consent and accountability, and submission and seduction. It does this
by reviewing the historical treatment of people's attempts to have their consent
"undone" for the purpose of mitigating their actions, furthering their causes, or
otherwise justifying their behavior. It then examines the unique treatment of
women who are seen to have been seduced, and it connects the submission
cases-heralded by many commentators as anomalous-to an archaic, but still
extant premise that women do not fully possess their own sexuality.
IV. LOOKING FOR ANSWERS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN AND
CONSENT AND UNDERSTANDING WHY THE LAW OPERATES AS IT DOES
The seductive tale of "the romance of patriarchal power" plays out a
dynamic familiar in literature and popular culture: The story involves a
harassing man who becomes the figure that the woman seeks to win over, to
please, and perhaps even to captivate, even as he lords over her a chance to
have her situation improved, to elevate herself, or to be magically "rescued"
from her circumstances. Professor Hilary M. Schor likens elements of this plot
to stories ranging from Jane Eyre to Working Girl to Cinderella and says, "It's
a story that is awfully hard to resist because it does something that is really
important for our culture. It mystifies power. It romanticizes the abuse of
power, and it teaches women to consent to things they otherwise might never
allow.' 182 Whereas one might think that actual stories of victims having been
sexually harassed at work would fly in the face of such paradigms, this is not
the case. It would appear that far from debunking the myth and mystique of the
fictional narratives, the actual harassment scenarios played out in the courts are
imitating and animating the fictional narratives.
What is the allure of these narratives? What draws people into this story
such that they consume it for entertainment and-a more sobering thought-
live and relive it in their own experiences? Professor Schor argues that these
narratives "promise us happiness, ... promise us people will see and love us
for ourselves,.... [and] promise us power."' 183 Most saliently, she argues, the
stories comfort would-be victims about their harassers, about the state of the
world in which they live, and the environments in which they work and interact
with others. 184 They do this by holding out the notion that those in power
ultimately have others' best interests at heart, and thus, Professor Schor argues,
182. Hilary M. Schor, Storytelling in Washington, D.C.: Fables of Love, Power, and Consent in
Sexual Harassment Stories, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1347, 1348-49 (1992).
183. Id. at 1349.
184. Id.
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"make it harder for us to stand up for ourselves, harder to stand up and say, yes,
this happened to me too and it wasn 't about love. They make it harder for us to
believe our friends when they come to us and say it happened to me."',
85
"The romance of patriarchal power" feeds into not only the way in which
victims respond to harassment, but also the way in which the law has responded
to harassment claims. Women in the workplace continually need to combat the
persistent notion that if they are lucky, they will somehow be "discovered,"
"chosen," or "rescued" by men. The law cannot resist identifying, insulating,
and rescuing a woman who has already identified herself as a victim and who
has already traded her submission for approval from the man whom she
identified as her victimizer. By swooping in to their rescue, while failing to
protect women do not submit, the law does a disservice to women in the
workplace.
As laid out in the previous Parts of this Article, courts have treated women
who fail to resist their harassers' advances differently from women who fail to
report harassment, by intervening in the case of the plaintiff who submits to her
harasser's advances and finding that a tangible employment action has
occurred. Is it that the law (and by extension-society) sympathizes more with
women who acquiesce to sexual overtures than with women who quietly resist
them, such that it will read coercion into that consent? Or is it that women who
engage in a sexual relationship with those who wield power over them are
deemed more in need of being rescued than women who are willing or able to
walk away from a harassing supervisor? It is interesting to note that victims of
hostile work environment harassment who fail to report it are often not
necessarily the objects of their harassers' desire, whereas plaintiffs in
submission cases clearly are. This preference in the law insulates, protects, and
favors those victims who are deemed "desirable" enough to be propositioned
by their harassers. It could be said that the law appears to be seeking to rescue
women in the submission scenarios, while those who toil under unfulfilled
threats are left to reckon with their failures to report them, irrespective of why
they failed to do so.
The disparity between the constructive discharge jurisprudence and the
submission jurisprudence is not, as scholars have claimed, the result of courts'
desires to help plaintiffs' cases survive despite the often fatal blow that the
affirmative defense strikes, or courts' misapprehension of agency law and the
law of Faragher and Ellerth. Rather, the inconsistency in the jurisprudence is a
natural extension of a notion that has been deeply embedded in cultural
consciousness since law's earliest recorded days: the notion that women do not
truly own their sexuality. 186 Accordingly, outside the context of sexuality,
185. Id.
186. See generally Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of
Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?, 36 GA. L. REv.
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women whose consent may be harmful to themselves or their cases have not
traditionally been able to justify, excuse, or otherwise "undo" their behavior. In
contrast, women who fall prey to "seduction" have been and are still treated by
courts as something less than consenting adults. The sexual
harassment/submission cases are current paradigmatic examples of the law's
willingness to step in and subvert the integrity of female consent. In undoing
consent, courts seem to be motivated by a sense that the woman's will was
overcome, and that she was coerced to act to such an extent that she should not
be held accountable for having made a decision.
In support of this proposition, this Article will now look at the bifurcation
of the courts' and the law's treatment of women and consent first in contexts
outside of sex and seduction, and then in the context of sex and seduction. In
contexts outside of sex and seduction, women's consent, once given, has been
held to be volitional and valid. However, when it comes to allegations that
women have been "coerced" into engaging in intimate relations, even absent
the normally required indicia of an imminent threat, the law will cease to hold
them accountable for what were their own choices and actions.
Before reviewing the way in which the law has engaged the dynamic
between women and consent, it is important to note that this Article will
deliberately avoid discussing women and consent in the context of rape/sexual
assault, or whether a woman who seems to have given consent actually has.
This is to underscore the fact that in the submission scenario envisioned in this
Article, the harassment victim does, in fact, give consent to a sexual
relationship with her harasser, precluding a later charge of rape or sexual
assault against him.
411, 424-33 (2002) (describing early statutory rape laws as based on the understanding that women did
not own their own bodies); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1286 (1991); Kate Millett, What Is To Be Done?, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659, 662 (2000)
(describing the partiarchial view of female sexuality as something that "must always be legally
circumscribed, punished with poverty and illegitimacy and never permitted to be free and by their own
choice"); Tamara Packard & Melissa Schraibman, Lesbian Pornography: Escaping the Bonds of Sexual
Stereotypes and Strengthening Our Ties to One Another, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 299, 326 (1994)
(urging lesbians and other women to discover the erotic in order to take control of their own sexuality);
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of Forced Sex, 35 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 845, 865 (2002) (describing the traditional paradigm of romance in American culture as one in
which the man is sexually aggressive, while the woman is passive); Susan E. Thompson, Prostitution-
A Choice Ignored, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 217, 233-34 (2000) (describing the radical feminist view
of male dominance as one in which males view female sexuality as belonging to them); Jennifer M.
McKinney, Comment, Washington State's Return to Indeterminate Sentencing for Sex Offences:
Correcting Past Sentencing Mistakes and Preventing Future Harm, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 309, 318
(2002) (acknowledging the importance of historical concepts of male ownership of women in analyzing
sexual assault).
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A. Women and Consent: A Bifurcated History
It is crucial to view the law's disparate treatment of female victims of
harassment in different situations in its historical context. A look at the history
of the relationship and consent shows a clear bifurcation between the way adult
women are treated in the context of an allegation of seduction, and the way
they are treated in the context of other claims such as pressure or duress. Of
course, "consent" given by a subordinate of a harassing supervisor who is even
tacitly threatening her employment status is coerced. That said, depending on
the circumstances, a plaintiff who submits to supervisory advances may or may
not have a rational alternative means of staving off harm. The submission cases
equate the coercion implicit in submission with the victim's will being
overcome, without any query into the extent of that coercion. Consent given by
women in other contexts such as contract law is often engendered by any
number of coercive pressures, including social, economic, and professional
pressures. However, one is hard-pressed to find examples in which courts,
cognizant of the presence of these pressures, have eschewed them in lieu of an
automatic finding that one's will has been overborne.
1. Women and Consent Outside of the Context of Sex and Seduction
In a world that often seeks to avoid moral ambiguity by finding victims
and villains, it is unclear which appellation more fairly describes a
person who accedes to an unlawful threat.' 
87
Such is, as described by one scholar, the way in which society and the law
has viewed those who seek to be excused from or to otherwise "undo" actions
on the ground that they were coerced. As will be shown in this section, victims
of coercion, including women, have historically been expected to adduce
evidence of an immediate threat of some sort of grave harm before a court will
divest them of responsibility for their actions or omissions.'
88
187. Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1989).
188. See, e.g., Clearshot Holdings, LLC v. Nat'l Grid Wireless Holdings, Inc., No. 98 CIV.
3675(WHP), 2007 WL 4357834, at *9-*10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2007). The Clearshot Holdings
court noted:
The elements of economic duress have also been described as follows: "(1) that one side
involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no other
alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite
party.".. . Merely taking advantage of another's financial difficulty is not duress.
Because an element of economic duress is thus present when many contracts are formed or
releases given, the ability of a party to disown his obligations under a contract or release on
that basis is reserved for extreme and extraordinary cases.
Id.; see also Theisen v. Theisen, No. C6-99-2042, 2000 WL 979124, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18,
2000) ("Minnesota courts only recognize duress as a defense to a contract when there is coercion by
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Under common law, "[i]f conduct that appears to be a manifestation of
assent by a party who does not intend to engage in that conduct is physically
compelled by duress, the conduct is not effective as a manifestation of
assent. ' 89 Duress, according to the Second Restatement of Contracts, makes a
contract voidable at the option of the party claiming it, if that "party's
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that
leaves the victim no reasonable alternative." 190 Thus, duress is a defense to the
enforcement of a contract on the basis that wholly volitional assent was not
procured by a party to the contract. State courts have recognized the fact that a
contract may be invalidated on the basis of implied coercion where the
offensive conduct alleged is "of such a nature as to actually over-ride the
judgment and will of the other party."' 191
However, before women were deemed a protected class or even given the
right to vote, courts in this country acknowledged that women could give valid
consent and were ultimately responsible for their actions and decisions,
irrespective of the various pressures or motivations that compelled or
suppressed their actions. 192 In one case, a party brought suit to reform a deed
that had been executed by the defendant and his wife, alleging a mistake in the
deed's description of the land. 193 However, while the defendant-husband did
not object to the reformation of the deed, his wife averred that "she did not join
in the execution of the bond for title, and that she did not sign the deed of her
own free will, but that her signature and acknowledgment thereto was obtained
by coercion and undue influence of her husband." 194 The court, however, found
that neither
fraud was practiced [n]or coercion exercised upon her to obtain her
signature or acknowledgment to the deed.... She was unwilling to
sign the deed; but, inasmuch as she could not get the money therefore
without signing it, she permitted her great desire for the money to
means of physical force or unlawful threats, which destroys one's free will and compels compliance with
the demands of the party exerting the coercion.").
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174 (1981).
190. Id.
191. Harris v. Harris, No. CKOO-03979, 2006 WL 4551981, at *12 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 31, 2006).
192. See, e.g., Batton v. Massar, 369 P.2d 434, 437 (Colo. 1962) (holding mother's consent to have
her children adopted valid). In this case, the court found:
The record is devoid of evidence of fraud, coercion, undue influence, misrepresentation or
misconduct on the part of the adopters or their attorneys.... There is nothing to indicate that
the mother was lacking in understanding and she was fully advised as to the consequences of
her consent to the adoption .... It is not the law that one may avoid the consequences of his
voluntary acts, acts not induced by fraud, duress, coercion, etc., by proof that he or she: 'did
not realize the seriousness and finality of the papers she ... was signing.' Such a rule of law
would render every contract voidable at the whim of the maker.
Id.; see also Succession of Bendel, 116 So. 2d 84, 86 (La. Ct. App. 1959) ("A donation of community
property made by the husband to the wife is valid, because the wife alone has the right to complain of a
violation of Article 2404 of the Civil Code, which forbids the husband to make a donation of community
property, and when she consents the donation is valid.").
193. Bell v. Castleberry, 132 S.W. 649, 650 (Ark. 1910).
194. Id.
[Vol. 20:25
Consenting Adults?
overcome her will. This was not an undue influence exerted upon her,
or an involuntary act upon her part .... The statute does not require
that she shall execute it without motive, or as a mere act of generosity,
but that she shall execute it on account of acts of intimidation or
coercion by her husband, or from fear of injury from him, before it can
be said that she executed it through compulsion or undue influence on
his part .... [W]e cannot say that appellant was compelled to sign or
acknowledge the deed by reason of any undue influence exercised
upon her.
19§
The court refused to move from the notion that the wife had motivations
and desires compelling her to act to the notion that she was not fully
responsible for the free exercise of her will. More recently, courts have
continued to note that although many pressures and considerations may be
brought to bear by parties and/or circumstances in the procurement of consent,
these should not operate to divest that consent of its force and validity:
Wives contemplating divorce are often distraught and without
experience in negotiating contracts. Should contingent fee contracts
between them and the attorneys they employ under such conditions
become the usual fee arrangement, charges of overreaching and undue
influence will be all too frequent.'
96
This is also the case when women are accused of crimes and attempt to
claim that they were unduly coerced to act such that they bear no legal
responsibility for their actions. According to the Restatement of Agency, a
"servant or other agent is not relieved from criminal liability for conduct
otherwise a crime because of a command by his principal.' 97 Although this
Article has focused on exploring consent and the means by which the law
"undoes" or undermines it in the context of civil law, it should be noted that,
when one seeks to be exculpated from having committed an actual crime,
[t]o establish [the] defense [of duress and coercion], a defendant must
prove immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, a well-
grounded fear that the threat would be carried out if he did not commit
the crime in question and the absence of any reasonable opportunity to
escape the threatened harm without committing the offense. There
must be direct causal relationship between the criminal act and
avoidance of the threatened impending harm. The threat of harm must
be so immediate as to preclude both the opportunity to escape and to
seek assistance from law enforcement.
98
Indeed, the standard for alleviating one's responsibility on the basis that one's
actions were coerced is very high in the context of criminal law.
195. Id. at 651.
196. In re Cooper, 344 S.E.2d 27, 34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359A (1958).
198. Gatto v. U.S., 997 F. Supp. 620, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citation omitted).
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Moreover, the Model Penal Code permits a defense based on coercion only
where the coercion involves another's "use of, or a threat to use, unlawful
force ... that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been
unable to resist."' 99 Thus, this defense is only applicable where the defendant
can demonstrate a legitimate apprehension of actual physical harm to herself or
another.
200
A concrete example bearing out the general unavailability of the duress
defense to women accused of crimes occurs in the context of failure-to-protect
charges often brought against battered women with children-ostensibly the
population of defendants who are most vulnerable and most likely not to be
held accountable for their actions or omissions. Nonetheless, it remains the case
that lawyers rarely attempt a duress defense when representing battered women
charged with failing to protect their children, and courts generally have not
accepted such a defense when they do. 2
0 1
Similarly, in a civil context, the Restatement of Agency provides that the
tortious actions of an agent who claims to have acted at the behest or command
of a principal will not typically absolve him of liability. 20 2 Moreover, according
to the Restatement, even "[t]he fact that the agent acts under physical or
economic duress used by his principal does not relieve him from liability for
causing harm to another."
20 3
It is thus clear that a "Nuremberg" or "superior orders" defense, in which
one claims that one should not be legally accountable for one's actions due to
undue coercion, will not ordinarily be successful in most areas of the law,
absent a threat of imminent physical harm.20 4 Despite the fact that diverse
professions have been known to factor in claims of "superior orders" to
199. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (2001).
200. See Carol M. Rice, The Superior Orders Defense in Legal Ethics: Sending the Wrong Message
to Young Lawyers, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 887, 907 n.54 (1997) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.09(1)).
201. Heather R. Skinazi, Comment, Not Just a "Conjured Afterthought": Using Duress as a
Defense for Battered Women Who "Fail to Protect," 85 CAL. L. REv. 993, 993 (1997) ("[A] battered
woman who is charged with killing her abuser and argues self-defense, possesses a better chance of
exoneration than a battered woman who is charged with failing to protect her child and argues duress.").
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958) (noting that exceptions exist where "he is
exercising a privilege of the principal, or a privilege held by him for the protection of the principal's
interests, or where the principal owes no duty or less than the normal duty of care to the person
harmed.").
203. Id. § 343 cmt. e.
204. See, e.g., Coaker v. Home Nursing Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 95-0120-AH-C, 1996 WL 316739
(S.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 1996). In Coaker, the Court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that her employer's offer
to transfer her after she was accused of falsifying documents was a pretext for racial and disability
discrimination. The court rejected her "Nuremberg defense-She was only following orders," and noted
that she had failed to produce "any document that she claims was falsified by anyone other than herself."
Id. at * 18.
[Vol. 20:25
Consenting Adults?
mitigate fault in disciplinary proceedings, superior orders defenses are not
typically set forth in their codes of ethics.
205
Perhaps the best example of courts' rejection of the idea that one can,
absent an immediate threat to one's physical wellbeing, have one's agency
limited where one alleges only professional or financial pressures is the
caselaw on constructive discharge. As discussed in Suders, the Supreme Court
held that constructive discharge was not a tangible employment action because
"[u]nlike an actual termination... [a] constructive discharge involves both an
employee's decision to leave and precipitating conduct: The former involves no
official action .... ,206 The determination that a wholly compelled departure
could be termed a "decision to leave" is simply inexplicable. Outside of the
context of submission and seduction, the law has treated female litigants as
fully accountable for their actions and omissions, despite various financial,
professional, and personal pressures often attendant to those actions and
omissions.
2. Women and Consent in the Context of Sex and Seduction
The historical relationship between women and consent, viewed through
the lens of the law, is tortured and complex. As one scholar describes it:
From at least the thirteenth to the second half of the seventeenth
century, the responsibility for regulating aberrant sexual behavior
belonged to the Anglican church. Local church "bawdy courts" tried
cases of adultery and meted out punishment by public humiliation.
Justices of the peace could impose further penalties; a cuckolded
husband who desired financial compensation, however, needed to
bring royal writs for abduction. The charge in such cases was theft of
chattels... even if the woman participated voluntarily.
20 7
Eventually, "seduction" cases came to be heard by secular courts, and a
shift in the theory underlying the cause of action evolved, such that "the
property interest that justified the plaintiff's trespassory complaint was located
not in his physical property but in the intangible property rights he enjoyed
through the contractually beneficial relationship of marriage," and "adultery
was fictionally represented as a tortious interference in a service
relationship.
'
"
20 8
205. Rice, supra note 200, at 908 n.58 (discussing "the official codes of ethics of the major
professional organizations in business, health, and law") (citing BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, CODES
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, at viii (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 2d ed. 1990)). Rice argues against the
American Bar Association's Model Rules, which afford young lawyers the ability to excuse misbehavior
when they claim that they were following supervisors' orders. See generally Rice, supra note 200.
206. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
207. Adam Komisaruk, The Privatization of Pleasure "Crim. Con." in Wollstonecrafi's Maria, 16
LAW & LITERATURE 33, 35-36 (2004).
208. LAURA HANFT KOROBKIN, CRIMINAL CONVERSATIONS: SENTIMENTALITY AND NINETEENTH-
CENTURY LEGAL STORIES OF ADULTERY 49 (1998).
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It is certainly the case that historically, an unmarried woman's consent
would be deemed "irrelevant" in certain criminal contexts pertaining to
intimate relations, and this, according to another scholar, "might be explained
as the law's desire to protect the woman's chastity even when she, presumably
incorrectly, had determined not to protect it."'209 However, that scholar
continued, a more powerful explanation for the law's discounting female
consent is that this is the law's assertion of the
ownership interest of the dominant social group (men) being asserted
in the law to prevent the owned members of the oppressed group
(women) from determining the course of their own bodily integrity.
Such an act of self-determination would threaten the ownership rights
of men, as a group, over women, as a group.
210
From the early 1900s until World War II, U.S. civil law continued to treat
women as though they did not own their own sexuality, as though their chastity
was something that needed to be safeguarded for them through external
controls. For example, the denial of access to contraceptives to unmarried
people, laws compromising the rights of those born outside of wedlock, and
many public schools' denials of educational and enrichment opportunities to
single parents all served to evince "an elaborate array of indirect civil sanctions
that bolstered the legal and moral ban on nonmarital sex." 2
11
Despite the promulgation of numerous torts that dealt with extra-marital
sex, so-called "unchaste woman" were not, in many places and under many
circumstances, deemed eligible to bring suit for their own seduction or for a
breach of a promise to marry.212 At first blush, this appears to run counter to the
current treatment of submission plaintiffs as plaintiffs who endured a tangible
employment action; after all, submission plaintiffs are, in a sense, able to wield
their intimacy with their harassers as a sword to aid in their legal stance.
Nonetheless, the very fact that sex with a woman who was not one's wife could
result in a civil suit for recompense for her "seduction" illustrates the fact that
the law viewed a woman's sexuality as something disembodied from her-
something that could be "taken" from her, even if she were a willing
participant. Given that she could not even bring the suit, these cases seem to
reflect the notion that, not only was a woman's sexuality not her own, but it
actually belonged to someone else.
We might see the presumption that submission plaintiffs have been coerced
to consent by the threat of a change in their employment status-such that their
own act of agreeing to have sex is deemed to be an affirmative act committed
209. Keith M. Harrison, Law, Order, and the Consent Defense, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 477,
490 (1993).
210. Id.
211. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777, 784-85 (1988).
212. See id. at 789-90.
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against them-as a modem day extension of the ideals underlying the
jurisprudence of seduction. One scholar has described the "Catch-22" inherent
in the law of seduction: "At the level of formal legal doctrine, women
perceived as 'virtuous' were technically protected from sexual exploitation by
men other than their husbands. But... exploitation or victimization itself often
served to degrade the female victim." 2 13 It is hard to miss the irony of a modem
victim of harassment that has her legal status (as a plaintiff) formally
"protected" by a legal rule that affords her the ability to cite her own
"seduction" as a tangible employment action, but simultaneously has her legal
status (as an adult capable to consent) compromised by the "undoing" of her
consent to the seduction.
B. The Dangerous Implications of the Submission Cases
The disparity in the ways in which courts treat differently-situated
harassment victims has a powerful impact on the validity of a woman's
consent. Women who engage in sex with more powerful, and often older, male
supervisors in the workplace are seemingly "excused" from their decision as
Courts deem their actions to be too coerced to be volitional. Yet this trend
simultaneously undermines and undoes women's consent. Although seduction
victims are successful in showing a tangible employment action, thereby
immunizing their claims from the affirmative defense, their consent is
subverted, mitigating its power and striking at its integrity.
On one hand, it is relatively simple to see why the choice to submit to
one's harasser may be less than wholly volitional. As one scholar has noted
[K]nowledge of the right to withhold consent and an opportunity to
reflect, do not guarantee that consent will be voluntary in a sense of
manifesting free will and true choice. Knowledge is not synonymous
with unconstrained actual choice. Women, for example, usually know
that they have a right not to consent to sex. In many cases however,
particularly in the context of date or marital rape or sexual harassment
by employers, women nonetheless "consent," and submit to the
socially empowered and domineering male even absent an overt threat
or force. We would not infer that in all of these cases women
consented to have sex in the sense of free choice and unconstrained214
agency.
Nonetheless, current sexual harassment case law ignores the fact that the so-
called choice not to make use of a reporting mechanism may be just as coerced
as the choice to have sex with one's supervisor. The question persists as to
whether, in keeping with the goals of Title VII and sexual harassment
213. Id. at 789.
214. Dana Raigrodski, Consent Engendered: A Feminist Critique of Consensual Fourth
Amendment Searches, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 37,48 (2004).
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jurisprudence, the supervisory coercion of all such detrimental choices ought to
implicate automatic employer liability. The Supreme Court's stance on
constructive discharge as failing to constitute a tangible employment action,
and its stance on the fate of victims without tangible employment actions who
fail to report, ought to preclude the holdings in the submission cases.
Catharine MacKinnon has famously expressed her view that, "[a]s with all
prostitution, the women and children in pornography are, in the main, not there
by choice but because of a lack of choices." 215 According to MacKinnon, this
"consent" takes place "only in the degraded and demented sense of the
word.., in which a person who despairs at stopping what is happening, sees no
escape, has no real alternative... [and] is almost always economically
desperate, acquiesces in being sexually abused for payment .... 2 16 Applying
this notion in the sexual harassment context, it is unfair not to recognize the
quiet desperation with which submission plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases
acquiesce, the price that they are willing to pay for their economic and
professional survival, and the constraints to which they have been subjected.
Unfortunately, the problems inherent in the view that the constrained agency of
women is tantamount to no agency are obvious and intractable. Is the law to
preclude (in any number of contexts) all but the most paternalistic of
resolutions: foreclosing most "consensual" sexual behavior engaged in by
women under the theory that it is, at its core, involuntary? 21 7
Political theorist and legal ethicist Alan Wertheimer has addressed the
relationship between rational wealth maximization and consent. Wertheimer
advocates, among other things, gauging whether permitting intoxicated consent
to be transformative will be in a group's welfarist interests by asking whether
the group's members, when sober, would wish their intoxicated consent to be
valid.2 18 In the context of the submission cases, we must think about whether
women would want their consent to be intimate with another, although given
under extreme pressures that touch upon their professional, financial, and
emotional well-being, to be deemed valid later. If financial, emotional, or
economic pressure is enough to undo a woman's ostensible consent in a
harassment context, her consent given under routine pressures and
considerations that bear upon and inform decisions in other contexts will also
be susceptible to challenge. The clear implication for harassment victims whose
consent to submit to their harasser's overtures is undone in court for the
purposes of claiming a tangible employment action is that the face value of
their consent is devalued.
215. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 993, 995 (2005).
216. Id.
217. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691,
746-47 (1997). Professor Franke takes note of the fact that the very "requirement that the plaintiff prove
the sexual conduct was unwelcome clearly presupposes a degree of female agency in these contexts." Id.
218. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 250-53 (2003).
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As alluring and laudable as the rescue of submission victims may appear to
courts, it is accomplished at the cost of devaluing female consent. The
propagation of women's relative weakness in the workplace is accomplished by
the law's need to rescue women from their own choices. Looking at the
dynamics of a typical sexual harassment scenario aids one's understanding of
why the law has done this, even as it underscores the disservice that it does to
harassment victims.
Professor Schor has conceptualized the trajectory of what she termed a
"sexual harassment story" as it unfolds for many women, concluding that many
victims react by feeling confused and flattered, forgiving, and even somehow
complicit, in the face of a harasser's inappropriate behavior: "Well, we call it
sexual harassment when it happens to someone else. When it happens to us we
say, 'Well, I'm sure it was really my fault' or 'It was just this once; I'm sure he
didn't mean it' or 'These things happen."'
219
Using now-Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas's alleged sexual
harassment of Anita Hill as an example, Professor Schor characterizes the
Senate Judiciary Committee's response to Hill as dismissive, insinuating that
incidents like those that she alleged "happen," and that she would just have to
"take it."220 Finally, though, the Committee conveyed to Hill a message, often
transmitted to victims of harassment, that was "more insidious: 'Didn't you
know what was going on?' They said, 'What did you think you were getting
into?' They said, 'If you took it so seriously, why didn't you do
something?'
221
Professor Schor ultimately concludes that "the entire notion of consent is
rendered suspect in relations of unequal power 222 and entreats women to stop
equivocating when they recount their stories of victimization and to stop
22blaming themselves for the actions of their harassers. 23 She declares that
society and its folklore need to stop telling victims: "'Oh, don't say anything,
you'll get in trouble' . ... 'They'll never believe you' . . . 'Oh come on, it's
more trouble than it's worth."', 22 4 She is correct. These are the messages, the
reverberations of the stories and signals that society has consumed and
reenacted until now, and the unfortunate lessons of past victims' experience.
But this is only half of the problem in sexual harassment law. Once the gap
between the expectations (imposed by society and the law) placed upon victims
and the messages telegraphed to them (by the same sources) is bridged, victims
should start to report harassment in ways that they have not been reporting it
and thereby preclude the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Until this happens,
219. Schor, supra note 182, at 1349.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1350.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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however, the Supreme Court's pronouncement that a constructive discharge is
not a tangible employment action and the existence of the Faragher/Ellerth
defense are unfair, but extant, stumbling blocks.
The other half of the problem is society's need to infantilize and rescue an
adult woman, who has not been the victim of any violent crime, and who has
declined to either report her harassment or otherwise escape it, and instead has
acquiesced to her harasser's demands. Professor Schor has called for the
rewriting of the harassment story from the point of view of the victim, "a task
even harder than winning structural power because it means redefining,
renaming, even reimagining our own relationship to power. We must find ways
of making the courts listen, of making universities listen, of making the media
listen, of winning a different hearing for ourselves and our own stories."225 This
task is made impossible by the submission cases, and the way in which they
educate would-be victims about the fact that they will fare better under the law
and bypass the consequences of their failure to report by consenting to their
harassment.
The insulation of harassment plaintiffs from the affirmative defense in
submission cases, and the exposure to the defense of plaintiffs who have been
constructively discharged has implications, and indeed, reflects upon the
normative values of our current legal system. The plaintiff who acquiesces to
that which she knows is wrong-intimate relations with a supervisor for the
sole purpose of retaining her job-fares better than the plaintiff who resists.
This does not serve to protect victims of harassment, nor does it induce
behavior that is strong and thoughtful in the face of indecent and aggressive
threats made by supervisors entrusted by defendant entities with the ability to
exact a tangible employment action on a victim, regardless of whether or not
they actually do.
CONCLUSION
The "romance of patriarchal power" narrative is alive and well in the facts
and opinions of the submission cases. Held next to the Supreme Court's failure
to assign "tangible employment action" status to a constructive discharge-the
legal breaking point of a harasser's ability to inflict torment upon his victim-
the submission cases teach victims, harassers, and society alike a perverse
lesson: The law will afford you more protection and support as you go about
vindicating your civil rights if you have engaged in a sexual relationship with
your harasser than if you have permitted yourself to be forced out of
employment.
225. Id.
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By her own account, Monica Lewinsky initiated her affair with President
Clinton.226 There is no evidence that she felt compelled to engage in a sexual
relationship with him because she feared that, if she did not, she would lose her
job. She was nonetheless deemed a victim by many members of the press and
of society because of the president's status, age, and gender as opposed to her
own. If Monica Lewinsky can be branded a victim, why should anyone be
surprised that sexual harassment plaintiffs who have sex with their harassing
supervisors have been cast by courts as the ultimate victims-incapable of
giving consent that has any validity?
Victims who have been constructively discharged, whether or not they
opted to have a sexual relationship, likely ought not have their claims rendered
vulnerable to the interposition of the affirmative defense. However, in any
event, the stark act of consenting to sex with one's supervisor certainly should
not operate to privilege a claim on the basis of victims' (and thus generally,
women's) perceived wholesale inability to make a better choice than to
227
acquiescence under any set of circumstances.
The choice to acquiesce to the advances of a harasser is no more compelled
or constrained than the "choice" a victim makes to refrain from reporting her
harassment through the proper internal channels prior to the point at which her
situation approaches a constructive discharge. It is certainly no more compelled
or constrained than the "choice" that a constructively discharged plaintiff
makes to quit her employment. Immunizing submission plaintiffs from the
Faragher/Ellerth defense, while holding other plaintiffs responsible for their
failures to report their harassment by rendering their claims vulnerable to the
defense, infantilizes women.
The roots of the disparity between the way in which constructive discharge
plaintiffs and submission plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases are treated by
the law lie in the law's historical treatment of women-the majority of sexual
harassment plaintiffs-as people who are not in possession of their own
sexuality. The law, however, persists in subscribing to a bifurcated notion of
women's accountability for their actions and omissions in and out of the
context of sex and seduction. In the end, whether motivated by an entrenched
puritanical notion that "sex is bad," by an ignorance of the ways in which
pressures and constraints operate upon victims who feel forced to walk away,
226. Cathy Young, Maybe the Clinton-Lewinsky Fiasco Will Bring Some Sanity into the Sexual
Harassment Debate, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1998, at 21.
227. Professor Gruber has argued, in the context of analyzing and criticizing the victims' rights
movement, that "[b]y projecting onto defendants the character of totally autonomous individuals and
onto victims the character of perpetual victimhood, society can distance itself from responsibility for
crime." Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REv. 741, 783 (2007). Similarly, courts
that bestow a further dimension of "victimhood" upon those already victimized by harassment simply
because they opted to engage in relations with their harasser appear to be operating under the
presumption that these women were incapable of making the responsible, harm-avoiding choice of
reporting that the courts expect all other plaintiffs/victims to make.
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or by something else entirely, various courts' disparate notions of what
constitutes a choice and, ultimately, what amounts to a tangible employment
action, are harmful.
To be sure, recognizing the power disparity inherent in the relationship and
interactions of a would-be male harasser and female victim sheds light on the
intractable problems in crafting harassment jurisprudence. Professor Schor has
noted, with some frustration, that the fact that her own university declared that
a policy that would limit "consensual relations" between faculty and students
would have a chilling effect on voluntary interactions between faculty members
and students and ultimately burden and disenfranchise the very group of female
students the policy sought to protect.228 She has eloquently stated the case for
women in the workplace: "Women do not want to be seduced and they do not
want to be loved. They want to be taken seriously, they want their work to be
taken seriously, they want their careers to be taken seriously." 229 Certainly the
way for the law to facilitate these goals is not for it to treat submission
plaintiffs as too compromised to function as accountable adults, while
simultaneously holding women who fail to report harassment to super-human
standards of care, courage, and wisdom.
228. Schor, supra note 182, at 1350.
229. Id. at 1350-51.
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